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With the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, the United States
initiated a fundamental change in the purpose of military forces. Bernard
Brodie, a nuclear strategist of the time, noted that before 1945, military force
was intended to fight wars. Once equipped with nuclear weapons, however,
the role of military forces could only be to prevent war— most importantly,
to prevent nuclear war. Policy makers of the time developed the strategy of
nuclear deterrence as a way to achieve this goal. Yet ever since its inception,
nuclear deterrence has been controversial. Often debated is the effectiveness
of the policy, the credibility of the policy, and the danger of the policy.
Perhaps the most philosophically interesting debate about nuclear
deterrence, however, has been over the charge that adoption of a nuclear
deterrence policy, together with certain assumptions about the
consequences of that policy, results in a moral paradox. This charge is based
on the fact that nuclear deterrence rests on the announced intention of the
United States (US) to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any aggressor
who attacks the US, or its allies, with nuclear weapons. It would seem that
this intention to retaliate, if it does deter potential aggressors, and thus
prevents nuclear attack, is a morally good intention. However, should
deterrence fail, and the circumstances under which retaliation was
threatened obtain, then it seems morally wrong to retaliate, since the result
would only be a doubling of the nuclear devastation. If it is wrong to
retaliate, then it seems that it must be wrong to intend to retaliate.
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Thus, the paradox arises from the fact that the intention to do the act
seems morally right based on the consequences of forming the intention, but
the intention also seems morally wrong, because the intended action is
morally wrong. This can also be viewed as a paradox of rationality, if we
consider, for example, that on one hand it can be rational to form the
intention to retaliate, if the consequences of forming the intention make
having the intention rational, but on the other hand, if retaliation is
irrational, then it also seems irrational to intend to retaliate. It is these moral
and rational paradoxes of nuclear deterrence that I want to examine in this
thesis. For convenience, I will refer to deterrence that generates these
paradoxes generically as "paradoxical deterrence." When my comments
apply to only one of the paradoxes (either moral or rational, but not both), I
will so indicate.
To introduce these paradoxes, I first want to trace the development of the
nuclear deterrence policy of the US. I then want to explain more fully the
circumstances that can make a policy of deterrence "paradoxical
deterrence," and then identify certain instances of deterrence under which
paradoxical deterrence does not arise. Finally, I will outline how I intend to
examine paradoxical deterrence throughout the rest of the thesis.
The debate about the morality of nuclear deterrence has existed almost
from the time that the policy was first adopted. Once the incredible power of
nuclear weapons was known, it became imperative to deter their use, thus,
the policies of nuclear deterrence were bom. Over the years, a variety of
tensions, hopes, fears, perceptions, and technological developments have
determined the shape of these policies.
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At the end of WWII, the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly and
proceeded to demobilize much of its conventional armed forces, while the
Soviets continued to maintain a very large military. The first seeds of tension
were planted during this period as the US continued to develop its nuclear
arsenal in order to ease its fears of the large Soviet military force, while at
the same time, the Soviets continued to maintain their large military in an
attempt to counter the growing US nuclear superiority. By the mid-1950s,
however, Soviet nuclear development had progressed to the point that they
could credibly threaten the US homeland. The US no longer possessed a
nuclear monopoly, although it did possess a technological advantage.
After the Korean war, the Eisenhower administration developed a
strategy designed to rely on nuclear weapons in lieu of a large conventional
(non-nuclear) force. This policy became known as "massive retaliation." It
threatened that, in the event of Soviet aggression, the US would devastate the
Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons.
Two criticisms of that policy are still pertinent for the philosophical
debate today. First, it was pointed out that the Korean war, a non-nuclear
war, had taken place during a period of US nuclear monopoly. Thus, it seemed
that there were very real limits to the types of aggression that nuclear
weapons could deter. Second, concerns were raised that the massive,
indiscriminate counterattack against the Soviet homeland threatened under
"massive retaliation," would be immoral and thus, not believable or credible.
If the Soviets did not believe that the US would actually "massively retaliate,"
then the policy would have no deterrent value. This criticism was important
for two reasons: First, it raised the important question of the morality of
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nuclear retaliation. Second, it identified the fact that for nuclear deterrence
(and perhaps any type of deterrence) to be effective, it must be credible.
Although the question of whether retaliation using nuclear weapons
was immoral remained, strategists did attempt to increase the credibility of
the nuclear threat by developing strategies that involved the concepts of
"limited nuclear war" and "counterforce targeting."
The concept of "limited nuclear war" stressed the ability to use nuclear
weapons in selective ways against specific targets rather than relying on
the all-out strategic retaliation threatened under "massive retaliation." In
theory, the threat to use smaller, faster, and more accurate nuclear weapons,
that could be targeted against primarily military targets, would be more
credible than a threat of massive retaliation against population centers. It
was thought that if the threat to retaliate could be made more credible by this
new targeting policy, then it would have greater deterrent value.
However, difficulties were immediately apparent with this strategy.
First, it introduced another of the paradoxes of deterrence theory: that
nuclear war was to be made less likely by making it more likely. Specifically,
the difficulty with this line of reasoning was that one could not be sure that
it was the credibility of the deterrent that would increase, rather than the
actual likelihood of nuclear war. It wasn’t clear that a limited nuclear war
could be kept limited. It seemed reasonable to expect that if one side began to
perceive that it was losing a limited nuclear exchange, then it would begin to
employ larger weapons in a less discriminating way. It seemed that the net
result of the limited war strategy was to remove some inhibitions to the
conduct of nuclear war without providing any way to keep nuclear war
within any kind of limits.
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These same concerns about the credibility of "massive retaliation" also
led to the formulation of the distinction between "countervalue" targeting
and counterforce" targeting. "Countervalue" targeting is targeting of
nuclear weapons against cities and industries regardless of their military
importance. "Counterforce" targeting, on the other hand, is the targeting of
purely military targets, in particular, the nuclear weapons of the other side.
The massive retaliation policies of the 1950s were countervalue.
During the 1960s, counterforce policies were considered in order to
relieve a number of tensions that arose from policies of countervalue.
Credibility was certainly a key consideration. As discussed above, retaliation
against military targets posed a much more credible threat to the Soviets
than did massive retaliation (countervalue). Counterforce was also intended
to serve the purpose of damage limitation to the US homeland. It was thought
that if the US announced war plans that called for retaliation against Soviet
military targets rather than Soviet cities, the Soviets would respond in kind
and not attack US cities.
By the mid- 1960s, however, it was clear that counterforce policies would
not solve these problems. First, it was uncertain that the Soviets would follow
a policy of not attacking US cities if the US did not target Soviet cities. Second,
it became apparent that counterforce policies, despite possible gains in
credibility, were perhaps more unstable than countervalue policies. This
followed from the fact that if the Soviets knew that their military and
missiles were the primary targets of the US, then they would have a greater
fear of a US surprise attack aimed at destroying their missiles. To preclude
this possibility, the Soviets might be tempted to initiate a preemptive attack
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m order to protect their own missiles. The US would then fear such a
preemptive strike also, and the situation would become very unstable.
This instability can also drive a costly arms race as each side seeks
advances in technology that will increase the speed and accuracy of their
weapons in order to prevent their destruction under a surprise attack. Each
side may also be driven to installing automatic systems that launch missiles
as soon as launch of the opponent's missiles is detected. Such systems tend to
put the launch of missiles on a hair trigger, increasing the chances of
accidental or mistaken missile launches, which will further increase
tensions and destabilize the strategic balance. As a result of these concerns,
the US, by the mid- 1960s, had returned to policies of countervalue
deterrence, which had then became known as "mutually assured
destruction" (MAD).
The US strategic doctrine has remained essentially the same from the
adoption of MAD through the 1980s. One significant difference, however, is
that there is now a mix of countervalue and counterforce weapons, and
weapons that can serve either role. Whether these weapons will serve to
create instability between the nuclear powers remains to be seen.
Since the US still maintains a strategy based primarily on MAD, many of
the same problems still exist: Is the threat of retaliation against the Soviet
population morally permissible? Is such a threat credible? Does such a threat
actually deter aggression? If so, what types of aggression, i.e., conventional
aggression and nuclear aggression, only nuclear aggression, nuclear
blackmail, etc?
I think that it's been clear over the years that our policies of nuclear
deterrence do not serve to deter conventional aggression. The US
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involvement in Korea occurred while the US had a virtual monopoly on
nuclear weapons. Conventional aggression by North Viet Nam was certainly
not deterred by the US nuclear arsenal. Continued Soviet occupation of
eastern Europe after WWII, and military actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afganistan were also undeterred by US nuclear weapons and policies of
nuclear deterrence. It seems that if nuclear deterrence deters anything, it
can only be nuclear aggression or nuclear blackmail (i.e., threatening use of
nuclear weapons in order to force another government to submit to some
political or economic demands). Some strategists argue that nuclear
deterrence does not even deter these behaviors and that the lack of nuclear
aggression and/or blackmail during the nuclear age can be shown to be the
result of other factors that have influenced strategic decisions.
Determining exactly what it is that nuclear deterrence does deter, if it
deters anything, is a very difficult question. Although it's a difficult
determination to make, the answer may be very important to the normative
evaluation of nuclear deterrence. For example, it would be important to know
what types of aggression nuclear deterrence will deter if one is making a
normative evaluation of nuclear deterrence that appeals to the consequences
of adopting the deterrent policy. The more types of aggression the policy
deters, then the better the expected consequences of the policy. I think that
it's very unclear whether a policy of nuclear deterrence can deter
conventional aggression. Therefore, for my purposes, I intend to assume that
nuclear deterrence has no deterrence value against conventional
aggression. Thus, when I discuss the benefits and hazards of nuclear
deterrence, I am assuming that nuclear deterrence policies only deter
nuclear aggression and/or nuclear blackmail.
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At the outset, I said that I wanted to concentrate on "paradoxical
deterrence." I explained that paradoxical deterrence arises from the cases
where it seems morally right to have the intention to retaliate (based on the
consequences of forming the intention), but also seems morally wrong to
form the intention to retaliate because retaliation itself is morally wrong. It
should be noted that not just any case of deterrence is "paradoxical
deterrence." Thus, we need to specify more explicitly what constitutes
'paradoxical deterrence," or at least identify those cases of deterrence where
the paradox does not arise.
One of the important features that seems required for paradoxical
deterrence to arise is that the intention to retaliate is a sincere intention,
and that the defender perceives that having the intention is the only way to
prevent a terrible disaster (a nuclear first strike), even though to carry out
the intention is to do something morally wrong. Gregory Kavka's Special
Deterrent Situations (SDS), which correspond to my "paradoxical deterrence",
note this requirement. He says that an agent in an SDS believes that the
following conditions hold:
"First, it is likely he must intend (conditionally) to apply a harmful
sanction to innocent people, if an extremely harmful and unjust offense is to
be prevented. Second, such an intention would very likely deter the offense.
Third, the amounts of harm involved in the offense and the threatened
sanction are very large and of roughly similar quantity (or the latter
amount is smaller than the former). Finally, he would have conclusive moral
reasons not to apply the sanction if the offense were to occur." 1
1 Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence" The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LXXV, No. 6,
June 1978, p. 286
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Kavka's first and second conditions appeal to the characteristics that the
intention must be a real intention and that the agent must believe that
having the intention will actually deter the offense, in order for
"paradoxical deterrence" to arise. Kavka notes that deterrence depends
importantly on the potential wrongdoer's beliefs about the prospects of the
sanction being applied. Thus, if the agent could successfully influence the
potential wrongdoer's beliefs by bluffing, i.e., by publicly announcing the
intention to retaliate while secretly intending not to retaliate if the offense
is committed, and if the potential wrongdoer did not detect the bluff, then we
would say that the agent had successfully deterred the offense.
Such a strategy as bluffing would be characterized as deterrence (since
the offense may be successfully deterred), but not as "paradoxical
deterrence." For in the case of bluffing, the agent actually has the intention
not to retaliate, although he has publicly announced that he will retaliate.
Thus, no paradox arises since the agent is not sincerely intending to carry
out a morally wrong action.
It may be that bluffing would be successful in deterring the potential
Wrongdoer. In fact, it may be that the best action for the US to pursue would
be some type of bluff that did not entail forming the sincere intention to
retaliate This helps to illustrate another point, hinted by Kavka's second
condition above: The agent must believe that the best way to deter the
potential wrongdoer, or the way with the greatest chance of success, is to
form the sincere intention to retaliate.
It seems that "paradoxical deterrence" requires that the situation be
such that the best (morally right, rational, util, maxing, etc.) course of action
requires the agent to form the sincere intention to retaliate. If it was the
case that the agent determined that bluffing would be the best method ol
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deterrence, then he should bluff. If the best course of action requires
bluffing, then it could not be morally right or rational to have the sincere
intention to retaliate. Thus, the paradox would not arise.
If we consider for a moment whether a policy of bluffing would be
better than the current US policies, we should note that many nuclear
strategists have claimed that the US would never be able to maintain
successfully a deterrence policy that relied on a bluff because we could
never keep secret the fact that we didn't really intend to retaliate. Herman
Kahn has written that our deterrent policy would not be credible,
"...unless we really intend to do it. If we are only pretending that we
would do it, the credibility and therefore the deterrent value of our force is
almost certain to be lessened by the automatic and inevitable leaks. While we
can probably keep the details of our war plans secret, it is most unlikely that
we can keep the philosophy behind them secret."2
Obviously, if the Soviets learned that our deterrent policies rested on a
bluff, and that our plans did not call for a retaliatory strike, it is likely that
our policies would have little deterrent value. Since the procurement and
modernizing of our nuclear arsenal is driven largely by our strategy, and
since this procurement and modernizing requires the work of a vast number
of contractors and subcontractors, I suspect that Kahn is correct in asserting
that leaks would be inevitable.
Nevertheless, there might be any number of other methods that would
be better than our current policies of nuclear deterrence or there may be
other reasons that independently make forming the intention wrong. David
Lewis has noted that,
2Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War . 2nd ed. Princeton N.J., Princeton University
Press, 1960.
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It might be wrong for independent reasons to form the deterrent
intention. For it might be too risky; it might be unlikely to succeed; it might
carry other costs, e.g., in damaging the relationship between the parties. Or
there might be a better means of dissuasion available. It might be possible to
deter without forming a conditional intention to retaliate: by pretending to
have the intention, by making retaliation automatic... or simply by leaving it
uncertain what might happen. "3
For paradoxical deterrence to arise, it must be the case that forming the
intention to retaliate is determined to be a morally right action. If there are
other possible courses of action that are better, or if forming the intention is
wrong for independent reasons, then the paradox does not arise.
Likewise, paradoxical deterrence requires that the act which is the
object of the intention, the act of retaliation, must be determined to be
morally wrong. From this, it is claimed that the intention to retaliate is
wrong because retaliation itself is wrong. Thus, if retaliation were morally
right, then the strategy might still correctly be called deterrence, but it
would not constitute "paradoxical deterrence." For in such a case, the
intention, and the doing of the action, would both be morally right, and thus,
no paradox arises.
How might this occur? It might be the case that US retaliation after a
Soviet strike does not necessarily require a total, indiscriminate nuclear
strike against the the Soviet homeland. Perhaps the US response would serve
to destroy only the remaining Soviet missiles in order to prevent a second
strike by the Soviets. A US retaliation might also serve to prevent the Soviets
from future world domination. It might also be that a retaliatory strike by
the US would serve to end a continuing nuclear conflict. If any of these
^David Lewis, "Devil's Bargains and the Real World," in The Secu rity Gamble:
Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, ed. by D. Maclean, p. 142
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possibilities were true, and retaliation were the best course of action, then
the paradox would not arise.
It also seems reasonable to exclude from "paradoxical deterrence" those
cases of deterrence where the morality of the intention or the retaliation is
dependent on external factors unrelated to the deterrence of nuclear
aggression. David Gauthier^ has suggested such an exclusion in his
discussion about the credibility of the intention in "paradoxical deterrence."
Gauthier is concerned that the credibility of the agent’s threat to retaliate is
lessened if the potential wrongdoer knows that the agent believes the act of
retaliation is not rational or is morally wrong. However, he thinks we should
be careful to insure that we reject cases where other, external circumstances
could be arranged so as to increase the credibility of the threat. Consider the
following examples:
Suppose the President of the US adopts a nuclear deterrent policy, but
believes that retaliation is morally wrong. There might be situations where
an external factor comes into play, perhaps that the President also believes
that he ought to be a man of his word. In fact, it might be that the President
feels so strongly about being a man of his word, that even though honoring
his expressed intention would lead to retaliation, he would prefer to retaliate
rather than not to honor his expressed commitment.
Another example might be a case where the President has made a side
bet that he would lose if he failed to retaliate under the specified conditions.
4David Gautier, "Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality," Ethics. 94, April 1984, p.
475-476
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His gain from winning the bet might be sufficient to make retaliation his
best course of action, in spite of the negative consequences of retaliation.
I think that these cases of promise keeping and side bets are examples of
types of cases that should be rejected as instances of "paradoxical
deterrence." In these types of cases, the situation is designed so that the
morality and rationality of the intention, or of the retaliation, is determined
by some factor that is completely unrelated to the nuclear deterrence
problem. I'm not interested in those cases, for example, where the benefits
from winning a side bet are what make retaliation the best course of action.
What I want to consider are the cases where the morality and rationality of
the intention and the retaliation are determined by issues commonly
associated with nuclear deterrence.
Gauthier also suggests that there might be cases where the President's
expressed intention is actually a warning that retaliation may be beyond his
control. For example, suppose the President were an imperfectly rational
individual. During his thoughtful, reflective periods he may realize that
retaliation is an irrational course of action. Yet if the Soviets were to attack,
his considered preference for not retaliating may be overcome by anger,
rage, or panic in such a way that he might lose control and retaliate.
Likewise, suppose that in expressing the intention to retaliate the
President was actually warning the Soviets that a complex, irreversible,
automatic retaliation machine had been activated which would automatically
retaliate if the Soviets attacked. In this case, it seems that the President is
simply warning the Soviets that he no longer has control over the
retaliation; it will occur automatically if they were to attack.
The two examples above also illustrate another type of case that I do not
consider to be "paradoxical deterrence." In these cases, the situation has
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been constructed so as to take the act of retaliating out of the hands of the
agent or to make the retaliation an act of an irrational agent. I want to
consider those cases where the agent is fully rational, where the agent forms
the genuine intention to retaliate, and where it is fully in the power of the
agent to do or not do the retaliation. The cases where the agent may retaliate
during a wave of irrationality, or where a machine is activated over which
he has no control, may be cases of deterrence, but I do not consider them to
be instances of the "paradoxical deterrence."
I think that the above discussion illustrates four limiting conditions that
a case of deterrence must meet in order to be "paradoxical deterrence." First,
it must be the case that forming the intention is the best course of action. If
forming the intention is wrong for independent reasons, then the paradox
does not arise. Second, it must be the case that carrying out the intention,
and actually retaliating, is morally wrong. If there are independent factors
that make retaliation morally right, then the paradox does not arise. Third,
"paradoxical deterrence" does not include those cases where the morality of
the intention or the retaliation depends on factors that are completely
unrelated to the deterrence situation (e.g., side bets or beliefs in promise
keeping). Fourth, "paradoxical deterrence" does not include . those cases
where the expressed intention is actually a warning to the potential offender
that the act of retaliation is beyond the control of the agent.
With these conditions in mind, we can move on to considering whether
the nuclear deterrence policy of the US is a case of "paradoxical deterrence ,
and if so, whether the paradox can be solved. I have defined "paradoxical
deterrence" as the instances of nuclear deterrence where there are two lines
of reasoning about the normative status to retaliate: First, is the line of
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reasoning which shows that forming the intention to retaliate is morally
right, and rational, based on the consequences of forming the intention
(primarily the consequence of preventing nuclear war). Second, is the line
of reasoning which shows that forming the intention to retaliate is wrong
because retaliation itself is wrong, or irrational. This line of reasoning uses a
moral principle which holds that it is wrong to intend to do something that is
wrong.
In Chapter 2, I want to examine more closely the first line of reasoning
that is based on an assessment of the consequences of forming the intention
to retaliate. I will present and explain some commonly discussed principles of
morality and rationality, such as the Maximization of Expected Utility,
Disaster Avoidance Principle, Maximization of Total Expected Utility and
Maximin, that utilize consequences in assessing the normative status of an
action. I will suggest applications of these principles to the case of nuclear
deterrence, to see if they will plausibly support the first line of reasoning.
In Chapter 3, I will examine the second line of reasoning which holds
that the intention to retaliate is wrong because retaliation itself is wrong.
This line of reasoning depends on non-consequentialist principles that
determine the normative status of an action by appeal to features of the
action other than its consequences. This line of reasoning appeals to a non-
consequentialist argument to show that nuclear retaliation is wrong, and
then uses the Wrongful Intentions Principle(WIP), which holds that it is
wrong to intend to do an act that is itself wrong, to show that the intention to
retaliate is wrong. In this chapter, I will examine the non-consequentialist
principles used to show that nuclear retaliation is wrong, and then focus
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specifically on the WIP, to determine its usefulness and applicability to the
case of nuclear deterrence.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I want to draw some conclusions about "paradoxical




Paradoxical deterrence seems to be rooted in the following argument:
1. Retaliation is irrational.
2. If retaliation is irrational, then forming the conditional intention to
retaliate is irrational.
3. Therefore, forming the conditional intention to retaliate is irrational.
The argument appears to be sound. Yet many people believe that under
present circumstances, adoption of a nuclear deterrence policy, which
includes forming the conditional intention to retaliate, is the best way to
prevent a nuclear war, and thus is a completely rational course of action. A
conditional intention to do an act. A, is the intention to do A if a certain
specified condition were to occur. In the case of nuclear deterrence, the act
is US nuclear retaliation and the specified condition is a Soviet nuclear first
strike against the US. Thus, for the US to have the conditional intention to
retaliate means that it intends, if the specified condition occurs (the first
strike), to do the act (nuclear retaliation).
We are left in the seemingly paradoxical position of asserting that
forming a conditional intention to retaliate is rational based on its
consequences, while also accepting the argument above that concludes that
forming the conditional intention to retaliate is irrational because
retaliation is irrational.
The paradox seems to arise in the same way when we consider morality.
On one hand, the conditional intention to retaliate seems morally right if it
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prevents war, and on the other, the conditional intention to retaliate seems
morally wrong if retaliation itself is morally wrong.
The paradox arises from application of these different lines of reasoning
to evaluate the formation of the conditional intention. The argument above
concludes that the conditional intention is irrational based solely on the
irrationality of retaliation itself, disregarding possibly desirable
consequences from forming the conditional intention (I will call this the
non-consequentialist line of reasoning). The second line of reasoning
evaluates the conditional intention on the basis of the consequences of
forming the intention, without regard to whether the action intended is
rational or irrational (I will call this the consequentialist line of reasoning).
The paradox forces us to examine more closely the application of each of
these lines of reasoning to see if they are being applied consistently and
appropriately.
In this chapter, I want to examine the consequentialist line of reasoning
that leads to the conclusion that formation of the conditional intention is
rational or morally right. I will show that when we apply some of the most
widely discussed principles of rationality, and principles of morality, to the
case of nuclear deterrence, we will find that it is consistent with these
principles for the conditional intention to retaliate to be rational (moral),
even though retaliation itself is irrational (immoral) according to the same
principle.
I will first consider the rationality of forming the conditional intention
to retaliate. To illustrate this, I want to suggest applications of the principles
of Maximization of Expected Utility , Disaster Avoidance, and Maximin to the
case of nuclear deterrence. I think we will find that it is consistent with each
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of these principles for the formation of the conditional intention to retaliate
to be rational while the act of retaliating is irrational. These results suggest
that, under certain circumstances, it may be rational to intend to be
irrational.
Maximization of Expected Utility
I first want to consider the principle of Maximization of Expected Utility
(MEU), which can be formulated as follows:
MEU : An action is rational for a subject, S, if and only if it maximizes S's
expected utility.
In this discussion, I am concerned with the decisions and preferences of
the US. Therefore, according the MEU, an action would be rational for the US
if it maximized the utility of the US.
Application of MEU to the case of nuclear deterrence requires that one
determine the possible outcomes from each alternative action open to the
United States. We then determine the conditional probability (between 0-1)
for each of these outcomes, such that the sum of the probabilities of all the
outcomes of an action equals 1. We then assign a utility value to each of the
outcomes. For each outcome of an action, we multiply its utility by its
probability on the action. The sum of these products of the probabilities
times the values for all of the outcomes of an action is the expected utility for
that action. The rational action according to MEU is that action such that no
alternative action has greater expected utility. I will limit my discussion of
alternative actions open to the US to only two: forming the conditional
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intention to retaliate (which requires stockpiling nuclear weapons) and
nuclear disarmament.
I believe that the relevant outcomes for the action of adopting a nuclear
deterrent policy are the following: 1. Soviet first strike; 2. Soviet nuclear
blackmail; 3. Nuclear Peace; 4. Accidental US first strike.
I suggest "Soviet first strike" instead of "nuclear war" for the following
reason. The issue is whether or not to adopt a deterrent policy which
threatens the Soviets that if they use nuclear weapons against the US, then
the US will respond with nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Kavka
observes that such deterrent policies consist of "those conditional intentions
whose existence is based on the agent's desire to thereby deter others from
actualizing the antecedent condition of the intention. "5 US deterrence
policy is intended to deter the Soviets from "actualizing the antecedent
condition of the intention," i.e., it intends to deter them from launching a
nuclear first strike. While a nuclear deterrence policy specifically threatens
retaliation, neither the intended purpose of the policy, nor the success or
failure of the policy requires fulfilling the intention and retaliating. The
policy is simply intended to deter the Soviets from creating a set of
circumstances such that the US is forced to decide whether to launch its
missiles at the Soviets.
Short of an actual first strike, it would be possible for the Soviets to
threaten use of their nuclear weapons to dictate economic or foreign policy
terms that are not in the best interest of US. Thus, the possibility of nuclear
blackmail is a relevant outcome. Finally, we must note that adoption of a
deterrent policy assumes the stockpiling of nuclear weapons readily
5 Kavka, 290
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available for retaliation. Such stockpiling of weapons by the US also brings
with it the chance of a US accidental launch, which could bring about a
Soviet counter-attack. This potential for a Soviet counter-strike is of negative
value to the US and should be considered as an undesirable outcome of the
policy. The chance of a Soviet accidental launch would be included in the
chance of a Soviet first strike.
The outcomes for the policy of nuclear disarmament would be the same
as that of deterrence, except that US accidental launch would not be included
(the US would no longer maintain nuclear weapons under a policy of nuclear
disarmament).
There is great debate about the probabilities and values that can be
assigned to these outcomes. However, I think that the following assignment
in Table 2.1 would be plausible:
Table 2.1
Expected Utility Calculations: Deterrence vs. Disarmament
Outcome Probability Value PxV
Soviet First Strike .1 -1000 -10
Deterrence Blackmail .1 -750 -75
Nuclear Peace .75 1000 750
US Accident .05 -500 zll
Total: +550
Soviet First Strike .2 -1000 -200
Nuc. Disarm. Blackmail .4 -750 -300
Nuclear Peace .4 1000 _4QQ
Total: -100
Estimating probabilities of Soviet choices of actions is a very difficult
exercise. Yet we do know that the Soviets tend to be very cautious with their
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military power, particularly with nuclear weapons, and very protective of
their homeland. Thus, I think that the chance that the Soviets will launch a
nuclear first strike in spite of US threats of retaliation, and thereby
deliberately invite a nuclear counter-strike against their nation, is very
small. Likewise, it seems to me that a nuclear blackmail attempt by the
Soviets against a United States that also possessed nuclear weapons would
have very little chance of success. Thus, I suggest that the probability of
Soviet nuclear blackmail under deterrence is very small.
I think that the chance of an accident or mistake that resulted in a US
first strike is also very small. The safety systems built into nuclear weapons,
and the fact that multiple persons must act in unison to launch missiles
reduces greatly the chance of accidental launch.
I also think that the chance that the US might mistakenly believe that it
is under attack and launch its missiles in order to prevent them from being
destroyed on the ground is very small. The US does not have to fear that all its
missiles could be destroyed by a Soviet surprise attack due to the large
number that are deployed on submarines. The relative invulnerability of
submarines means that the President has some flexibility in waiting for
confirmation of warnings of Soviet attacks. Therefore, it seems to me that
there would be only a very small chance of missiles being launched in
response to mistaken detections of Soviet missile launches.
Soviet first strike, nuclear blackmail, and an accidental US launch
account for 25% of outcome probability on the action. Thus, the remaining
outcome, nuclear peace, can be set at .75.
If the threat of retaliation keeps the chance of Soviet first strike low,
then removal of that threat may increase the chance of a Soviet first strike.
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Thus, I have rated the chance of a Soviet first strike under disarmament as
higher than under deterrence. I also suggest that the possibility of Soviet
nuclear blackmail, under US disarmament, is somewhat higher than that of a
first strike. In some circumstances, nuclear blackmail may be a more
effective way for the Soviets to pursue their goals than launching nuclear
missiles at the US. And in most cases, a US without nuclear weapons would be
compelled to submit to the Soviet demands rather than risk even a limited
nuclear attack.
In assigning values. I'm suggesting that failure of the deterrent policy is
as bad as success of the policy is good. Nuclear blackmail by the Soviets,
which might include restriction of US free markets, the restriction of free
action by the US government, and threatened destruction of US military
facilities is rated very bad, but not as bad as a nuclear strike. Loss of US
freedoms is considered by many to be a catastrophic outcome, yet I don't see
it being as bad for the US as the nuclear destruction and long term nuclear
effects that would result from being the victim of a nuclear attack.
I assume that an accidental nuclear strike by the US would create
undesirable consequences for the US that would be half as bad as a first
strike by the Soviets. An accidental US strike would be much smaller than a
planned attack and we might expect the Soviet response to be proportional to
the attack. I'm also assuming that communication between the US and Soviets
would allow for warning and explanations of an accidental or mistaken
launch that would serve to reduce the Soviet response.
The value of these outcomes is held the same for the policy of nuclear
disarmament.
The calculations from Table 2.1 show that under the circumstances I
have suggested, adoption of a deterrence policy results in greater expected
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utility for the US than does a policy of nuclear disarmament. Thus according
to MEU, adoption of the deterrent policy is the rational course of action.
There may be debate about these calculations, but to make my point, I only
need to assume that these figures are reasonably plausible and could be true.
Now suppose the Soviets attack in spite of our threat of retaliation. We
are now faced with a new decision problem that includes possible actions
that were not part of the earlier calculations. The fact that the Soviets have
attacked presents two new possible actions to be considered: retaliation and
no retaliation. Having chosen deterrence previously, we can assume that the
US possesses the capability to launch a retaliatory strike. Thus, this is an
available action. The relevant choices now open to the US are retaliation and
no retaliation.
It seems to me that the relevant outcomes to the action of retaliation
would be the following: Retaliation might result in an unacceptable increase
in the nuclear devastation. By retaliating, the US would be doubling the total
amount of world-wide nuclear damage. Additionally, retaliation by the US
may invite a second nuclear strike by the Soviets, further increasing the
damage to the US without effectively ending the conflict. This outcome would
also include the possibility that once the Soviets had launched multiple
nuclear attacks against the US, it would attempt domination of what remained
of the US. On the other hand, retaliation might serve to end the war quickly.
A strike against the Soviets might destroy their remaining missiles or break
their resolve to fight. The Soviets might also stop fighting in order to deal
with their own nuclear devastation. Thus, retaliation might serve to end the
war in essentially a stalemate between the US and the Soviets, rendering
each unable to dominate the other.
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One outcome relevant to non-retaliation also seems to be that it might
end the war. If the US did not strike back, the Soviets may simply declare
victory and cease their aggression. This outcome assumes reduced nuclear
devastation because the nuclear exchange would be confined to the first
strike by the Soviets. Another outcome possible if the US did not retaliate is
that the one-sided Soviet nuclear attack would be followed by attempted
Soviet domination, primarily through what would now be very credible
threats to the US of nuclear strikes if Soviet demands were not met. Assuming
these are the significant outcomes, we might assign probabilities and values
as shown in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2
Expected Utility Calculations: Retaliation vs. No Retaliation
Outcome Probability Value PxV
Retaliation More destruction .55 -1000 -550
End the war .45 + 1000 +450
Total: -100
No Retal. End the war .6 + 1000 +600
Soviet domination .4 -500 z2£&
Total: +400
In the outcomes for retaliation, I'm suggesting the probability that
retaliation will result in increased nuclear destruction and the possibility of
Soviet domination is greater than the probability that retaliation would serve
to immediately end the war (e.g., by destroying all the remaining Soviet
missiles). If US retaliation did end the war quickly, however, both the US and
the Soviet Union would probably have enough damage that there would be
little chance that either would attempt to dominate the other or the world.
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If the US did not retaliate, the chances of ending the war and the
chances of Soviet domination may be fairly close. If the US failed to retaliate,
then it seems that there would be little purpose in the Soviets launching
more nuclear strikes. On the other hand, if the US did not respond to a Soviet
first strike by retaliating, we might expect the Soviets to be much more
likely to attempt domination of US policy or to use nuclear blackmail against
the US to further their goals because they would no longer fear US
retaliation.
I'm assuming that the negative value to the US of Soviet domination after
retaliation (included in the outcome of "more destruction"), and the outcome
from no retaliation, is less than it was in our first calculation. Once portions
of the US have suffered a nuclear strike, threats of domination by the Soviets
will seem less significant than if they were directed against an undamaged
US. We can see from the calculations above, that if the Soviets did launch a
first strike, the rational action for the US, according to MEU, would be no
retaliation.
The first MEU calculation (Table 2.1) was made to determine the action
which would be most successful in keeping the Soviets from launching a
nuclear first strike. If the Soviets launched a first strike in spite of our
policy of deterrence, then we face different circumstances and a different
decision about how to respond.
Thus, the second set of calculations in Table 2.2 reflects the new decision
problem faced by the US, given the occurrence of the Soviet first strike. The
second set of calculations is about new possible actions (retaliation and no
retaliation) that were not considered in the first set of calculations. My
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description of circumstances in the second set of calculations was intended to
show that it is consistent with MEU for there to be circumstances such that
formation of the conditional intention to retaliate is rational, but should the
specified conditions obtain, then MEU will show that retaliation itself is
irrational. Thus, there can be very plausible combinations of circumstances
such that it is consistent with MEU for it to be rational to intend an action
that would be irrational to perform.
Disaster Avoidance Principle
Another commonly suggested principle for determining rationality is
the disaster avoidance principle. Gregory Kavka has suggested a formulation
of the DAP that will be useful to my discussion here. His formulation of the
Disaster Avoidance Principle (DAP) is the following:
DAP : when choosing between potential disasters under two-dimensional
uncertainty, it is rational to select the alternative that minimizes the
probability of disaster occurrence.
^
In his application of DAP to nuclear deterrence, Kavka considers the
same two actions that were considered in the discussion of MEU: adoption of a
policy of deterrence and unilateral nuclear disarmament. He argues that
each of these actions may lead to a disaster. The practice of deterrence
against the Soviets may be unsuccessful and result in a Soviet first strike . 7
6Kavka, Gregory, "Deterrence, Utility, and Rational Choice, Theory and Decision. 12,
1980, p. 43
7Kavka describes the potential disaster from deterrence as nuclear war, rather than
specifically a Soviet first strike, implying that the US must retaliate as part of a policy of
deterrence. I believe that the US would have a choice about retaliation, even after adopting
a deterrent policy, thus in my discussion I will consider the potential disaster from
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Unilateral nuclear disarmament by the US may lead to world domination by
the Soviets. Thus, we are forced to decide between these two potential
disasters
When Kavka says that the decision is made under two dimensional
uncertainty, he means to indicate the fact that when the decision is to be
made, the agent does not have either (a) reliable estimates of the
probabilities of outcomes of the actions or (b) reliable utility estimates for
the outcomes of the actions. Kavka argues that,
"Assigning numerical probabilities to the possible outcomes of the
available choices would require selecting an appropriate reference class of
past situations to provide data on the relative frequencies of various
outcomes.
There is no unique reference class of past situations that can provide
relative frequencies of a Soviet first strike, or the frequency of Soviet
domination given US unilateral nuclear disarmament, that would provide the
evidence we would need in order to make accurate estimates of the
probabilities of these outcomes. Nor is there a scientific theory of
international relations that could predict these probabilities in some indirect
way. It seems unlikely that we could get reasonable people to agree on any
set of probabilities for the outcomes of a Soviet first strike and Soviet
domination.
Likewise, there is great difficulty in assigning utility values to the
outcomes. There is no empirical data on the effects of large scale nuclear
attacks or on world domination by an opposing power, so it is extremely
deterrence to be a Soviet first strike. I think that Kavka's arguments reach the same




difficult to estimate with confidence the utilities of the outcomes. The task of
defining a common measure of utility that can be meaningfully assigned to
such varied outcomes as nuclear war, loss of freedom, nuclear blackmail, etc.
is itself particularly difficult.
Although we can't estimate the utilities and probabilities with
confidence, Kavka argues that we can determine an ordinal ranking of the
values of the outcomes and the probabilities of the outcomes. He claims that
we can judge that the death and destruction from a nuclear attack would be a
worse disaster for the United States than would domination by the Soviets.
Kavka also claims that we can judge that the chance of nuclear attack
under deterrence is less than the chance of domination by the Soviets after
US nuclear disarmament. He argues that although we do not have reliable
quantitative estimates of the probabilities, the many methods of analyzing
the nuclear situation that do assign numerical probabilities all seem to agree,
at least in the ordering of their judgments, that a large nuclear attack would
be a worse disaster than domination by an opposing power and that Soviet
domination after US disarmament is more likely than a Soviet nuclear first
strike under deterrence.
9
According to DAP, if the greater disaster also has the greater probability,
then it is easily decided that the action that avoids the greater chance of the
greater disaster is the rational action. Yet with the structure of the problem
that Kavka suggests, we are faced with a choice between a greater chance of
a lesser disaster and a lesser chance of a greater disaster. Thus, when our
choice must be made under two-dimensional uncertainty, but we are
confident in our ordinal rankings of the values and probabilities of the
9Kavka, p. 45
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potential disasters, then according to DAP, the rational action is that action
which minimizes the probability of disaster occurrence. In this case,
adoption of a deterrent policy is the rational action since it will minimize the
probability of disaster occurrence.
Kavka believes that there are particular circumstances under which
application of the DAP is most suitable. He suggests nine conditions that
describe such circumstances. These are not axioms from which DAP is
derived but rather are statements of limiting conditions for highly plausible
applications of DAP:
1. The chooser lacks reliable quantitative probability and utility
estimates.
2. The chooser has confidence in his orderings of the conditional
probabilities of the various outcomes.
3. All disastrous outcomes are regarded as extremely unacceptable, (each
involves large amounts of negative utility).
4. The disastrous outcomes are judged to be of roughly the same order of
magnitude.
5. The chooser regards the utility disparity between the non-disastrous
outcomes as being small compared to the utility difference between the
disastrous and non-disastrous outcomes.
6. The choice is unique, i.e., not a series of like choices.
7. The probabilities of the disasters are not thought to be insignificant.
8. The probability of the greater disaster is not thought to be very large.
9. The probabilities of the disasters are not thought to be very close to
equal. * ®
There may be debate as to whether Kavka's assumptions in setting out
the problem meet these nine criteria. Kavka argues that they do. There also
may be controversy over whether or not Kavka's claims about the ordinal
rankings of the probabilities and values of the potential disasters are true.
One who raises such objections is Douglas Lackey, in his paper, Missiles and
10Kavka, p. 50-51
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Morals: A Utilitarian Look at Nuclear Deterrence." 11 He argues that Kavka's
assumptions do not satisfy all nine criteria and that Kavka's ordinal
judgments about values and probabilities of outcomes are wrong.
First, Lackey questions 12 Kavka's claims that the disasters of nuclear
attack and Soviet domination satisfy the fourth criterion, that the disasters
must be of roughly the same order of magnitude. Lackey seems to want to
argue that nuclear war would be orders of magnitude worse than domination,
and thus, DAP fails to provide a credible decision.
To answer the objection, it must admitted that there is great difficulty in
comparing values of nuclear war and Soviet domination. One possible way to
estimate the value that a nation places on independence is to consider
historical cases of nations fighting to prevent domination by a rival power.
In WWII, the Soviets lost between 10 and 15 million soldiers and civilians as a
direct result of their fight to stop the German invasion (others died later
from starvation and disease). Despite these staggering casualties, the Soviets
continued to resist the Germans. Thus, it could be suggested that a rough
quantification of the value of Russian independence at that time was about
10-15 million lives.
Desire to preserve the independence of the US may be just as intense.
Thus we might argue that there is some historical precedent for believing
that US independence could be worth as much as 10 million lives. Lackey
notes later in his paper that the estimates of US casualties from a Soviet first
strike have ranged from about 800,000 expected dead to about 20 million
expected dead. 1 3 Although we can't determine the actual number before
11 Lackey, Douglas, "Missiles and Morals: A Utilitarian Look at Nuclear Deterrence,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs . 11, (Summer 1983), 189-231
12 Lackey, p. 203
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such an attack, a range of 10-20 million expected dead might be a reasonable
estimate. Thus, we have a historical case of a nation willing to spend 10-15
million lives to preserve its independence and an estimate that perhaps as
many as 10-20 million people in the US may die in a Soviet first strike. Thus,
it seems plausible to argue that the potential disasters faced by the US could
be of roughly the same order of magnitude.
Lackey also argues that Kavka’s assumptions that the probability of
nuclear war under deterrence is less than the probability of domination
under nuclear disarmament are wrong. * 4 I don't think that there is a
definitive answer to this objection. Liberal commentators on the subject of
nuclear deterrence tend to rate the chance of war as high, while more
conservative thinkers rate it as low. To make my point, however, I only need
to assume that Kavka's claims about probabilities and values of outcomes are
reasonably plausible and could be true; and I think this is the case. If we
assume Kavka's claims to be true, then according to DAP, it is rational to adopt
a policy of deterrence because it is the action that carries with it the lesser
probability of disaster.
This conclusion that deterrence is the rational course of action is
reached without appeal to claims about the value or probability of the act of
retaliation. The rationality of adopting the deterrence policy is based on its
lesser probability of resulting in disaster.
Let us now suppose that even though deterrence truly offered us the
lowest probability of disaster, the Soviets launch a first strike in spite of our
threats of retaliation. We now are faced with a new set of outcomes and
13Lackey attributes the figure of 800,000 dead to Secretary of Defense Arthur
Schlesinger in Congressional testimony in 1974 and the 20 million figure to the US
government's Office of Technology Assessment in 1979.
14Lackey, p. 204
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probabilities to assess. As with MEU, it seems that the relevant choices of
action are a choice between retaliating, or not retaliating.
In applying DAP to this decision, we might judge that retaliation carries
with it the potential disaster that the nuclear destruction will be greatly
increased to some unknown amount (our act of retaliation will double the
nuclear devastation and perhaps will cause a Soviet counter-counter strike
which will increase nuclear destruction in the US). The disaster for the US
by not retaliating would be domination by the Soviets. Once the US chose not
to respond to the Soviet nuclear strike, the Soviets would feel more confident
in attempting domination or blackmail against the US since they would no
longer fear retaliation. It seems plausible to suggest that greater nuclear
devastation world wide and in the US would be a worse disaster for the US
than would Soviet domination.
I think it's also reasonable to expect that the probability of increased
nuclear devastation by retaliation is greater than the probability of
domination after not retaliating. Once the US launches a retaliatory strike, I
think there would be a high probability that the Soviets would launch their
remaining missiles to prevent them from being destroyed. Thus, there would
be a relatively high chance of further destruction to the US after retaliation.
There is also a significant chance of Soviet domination if the US does not
retaliate. Yet the chance that such domination could be successful is
probably less than the chance of more destruction given retaliation.
Assuming that these ordinal judgments are true, DAP tells us that retaliation
is irrational because it provides for a greater chance of the greater disaster.
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These examples suggest very plausible situations under which the DAP
tells us that adoption of a deterrent policy is rational but that the act of
retaliation would be irrational. Thus, we again see that it can be consistent
with a widely held principle of rationality for it to be rational to intend an
act that is irrational.
Maximin
The final theory of rationality that I want to consider is Maximin, which
may be stated as follows:
Maximin: An action. A, is rational for subject, S, if and only if there are
no alternative actions for S whose outcome is better than the worst outcome
of A for S.
Maximin is often employed in cases where one cannot determine with
confidence the probabilities that a given action will produce a given result.
Under Maximin, one determines the worst possible outcome for each
alternative action without attempting to determine the probability of the
outcome. The rational action, according to Maximin, is then that action (or
actions) whose worst outcome is the best.
Maximin does not show a preference between the choices of nuclear
deterrence or unilateral nuclear disarmament. The worst possible outcome
for the US, under a policy of deterrence, is that the Soviet Union ignores the
threat of retaliation and launches a nuclear first strike that destroys the US.
We also find that the worst possible outcome for the US under a policy of
unilateral nuclear disarmament is that the Soviet Union launches a nuclear
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first strike that destroys the US. Thus, the worst outcome is the same for
either action.
Maximin tells us that the rational action is that action such that the
worst outcome of any alternative action is no better than its worst outcome.
If we have only two actions, and the worst outcome of each is the same
(destruction of the US), then according to Maximin, both actions are rational.
Maximin does seem to be decisive when we consider the decision to be
made if the Soviets were to launch a nuclear first strike. Our alternative
actions would then be retaliation or no retaliation. The worst possible
outcome for the US by choosing retaliation would be a Soviet launch of all
their remaining nuclear missiles at the US once they detected launch of the
US retaliation. This would result in large areas of the US being rendered
uninhabitable with tens of millions of US citizens dead and millions more
starving.
The worst possible outcome of not retaliating seems to be the similar case
of the Soviets simply continuing to launch their missiles at the US until they
have no more left. This outcome is perhaps very unlikely, given the fact that
the US has not retaliated, but it would be the worst possible outcome.
The decisive factor between these two worst outcomes can be only that
there would be fewer nuclear warheads exploded in the world under the
action of no retaliation, because no US missiles would be fired. Nuclear
effects throughout the world, such as fallout, nuclear winter, damage to food
systems and oceans, etc. would be less under the action of no retaliation
which anticipates fewer nuclear warheads exploding. It would be in the
interests of the US to have less, rather than more, of the world contaminated
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or destroyed by nuclear effects, so it seems that the action of no retaliation
would be the rational choice.
Assuming that these claims about the worst possible outcomes are
plausible, then it seems that it can be consistent according to the principle of
Maximin for it to be rational to adopt a policy of deterrence and yet be
irrational to retaliate.
Principles of Morality
We have seen that it can be consistent under common principles of
rationality for the formation of the conditional intention to retaliate to be
rational and the retaliation itself to be irrational according to the same
principle. I now want to investigate whether we find the same result when
we consider the morality of the action. Specifically, I want to consider
whether there can be plausible circumstances under which it may be
morally right to form the conditional intention to retaliate and for
retaliation itself to be morally wrong according to the same principle of
morality.
To do this, I will consider the principles of Maximization of Total Expected
Utility and Disaster Avoidance, which hold that the morality of an action can
be determined from the value and probability of the consequences expected
from doing the action. These principles differ from those used to determine
rationality in that they utilize measures of the total amount of utility that is
expected to be produced by an action, rather than simply the expected utility
for the agent doing the action.
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Maximization of Total Expected Utility
The formulation of Maximization of Total Expected Utility (MTEU) is
similar to Maximization of Expected Utility which was discussed previously
except that rather than considering only the utility of a particular agent
(such as the US) MTEU holds that the action which maximizes the total
expected utility, is the action that is morally right. We can formulate MTEU
as follows:
MTEU : An action is morally right if and only if it maximizes the total
expected utility.
An action. A, "maximizes the total expected utility" if there is no
alternative action to A, with a greater balance of positive expected utility
over negative expected utility than A has.^ To determine whether an
action is morally right according to MTEU, we perform a calculation similar
to that of MEU. First, one determines the possible outcomes from each
alternative action open to the agent. We then determine the conditional
probability (between 0-1) for each of these outcomes, such that the sum of
the probabilities of all the outcomes of an action equals 1. We then assign a
utility value to each of the outcomes. For each outcome of an action, we
multiply its utility by its probability on the action. The sum of these products
of the probabilities times the values for all of the outcomes of an action is the
total expected utility for that action.
1
5
For my discussion, I will not attempt to define exactly what this measure of utility
would be. The only distinction I will make is to note that there are positive and negative
amounts of utility that correspond to consequences that are desirable or undesirable.
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In the case we are considering, the agent is the US. The relevant actions
that are open to the US remain the same as those of MEU: Deterrence or
Nuclear disarmament. When we assign a utility value to each of the outcomes,
we estimate the total amount of utility that is expected for the outcome,
rather than just the utility to the US as in the calculation for rationality. The
action that maximizes the total expected utility is morally right.
For this calculation. I’m suggesting that the relevant outcomes of
deterrence are the same as we've considered before: Soviet first strike.
Blackmail, Nuclear peace, and Accidental US strike, as well as the outcomes of
the action of nuclear disarmament: Soviet first strike, Blackmail, and Nuclear
peace. Probabilities of these outcomes on the action also remain the same.
The expected utility values of these outcomes are different because they
reflect the total expected utility rather than just the expected utility of the
US. I believe that Table 2.3 shows a plausible assignment of values:
Table 2.3
Total Expected Utility Calculations: Deterrence vs. Disarmament
Deterrence
Outcome Probability Value PxV
Soviet first strike .1 -2000 -200
Blackmail .1 -850 -85
Nuclear Peace .75 2000 1500
US Accident .05 -1000 -50
Total: 1165
Soviet first .2 -2000 -400
Blackmail .4 -850 -340
Nuclear Peace .4 2000 _m
Total: +60
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With this assignment of values, the value to the world of nuclear peace is
as good as a nuclear attack by one nation on another is bad. The negative
value assigned to Soviet blackmail includes the negative value to the US as
well as the negative value to other nations (particularly other western
democracies) that the Soviets may attempt to dominate or influence. Finally,
the negative value of a US accidental strike includes the negative value to
the Soviets as well as to adjacent countries that may be affected by the
nuclear strikes. I'm assuming that an accidental US strike would be much
smaller than a deliberate nuclear strike. Thus, the total negative expected
utility of an accidental strike would be less than the total negative expected
utility from a deliberate first strike.
As in the calculations for rationality, I only wish to claim that these
probabilities and values are reasonably plausible and could be true.
Assuming this, we find that adoption of a deterrence policy is the morally
right action, according to MTEU, because it is the action that maximizes the
total expected utility.
We can now consider the circumstances faced by the US if deterrence
fails and the Soviets launch a nuclear first strike. The US then would be faced
with the choice between retaliating and not retaliating. The relevant
outcomes of retaliation are 1) more destruction- from the US retaliatory
strike and potentially Soviet retaliation in response to the US retaliation.
This would also include the value of attempted Soviet domination of the US. 2)
End the war- US retaliation might destroy all the remaining Soviet missiles
or serve to break the Soviet will to continue the conflict.
The relevant outcomes of no retaliation would be 1) End the war- if the
US did not retaliate the Soviets might declare victory and end their
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aggression. 2) Soviet domination- after a nuclear first strike to which the US
did not respond, the Soviets could issue various economic, political and
military demands throughout the world accompanied with the very
believable threat of nuclear aggression if the demands are not met.
Assigning the same probabilities as I used in the earlier discussion of
rationality, we have the following calculations (Table 2.4):
Table 2.4
Total Expected Utility Calculations: Retaliation vs. No Retaliation
Outcome Probability Value PxV
More destruction .55 -4000 -2200
Retaliation End the war .45 + 1000 ±450
Total: -750
No retal. End the war .6 +2000 +120
Soviet domination .4 -1000
-AM
Total: +800
I think that the outcome with the most damaging effect world-wide
would be "more destruction," under the action of retaliation. This outcome
anticipates a sequence of nuclear strikes between the US and the Soviets,
where large portions of the world would be destroyed either directly from
nuclear explosions or indirectly from fallout, nuclear winter, etc. These
undesirable consequences would spread well beyond the borders of the US
and Soviet Union. This outcome also includes the negative value of Soviet
domination to the US of Soviet domination as well as the negative value to
other nations that the Soviets may attempt to dominate after a nuclear
exchange.
I have suggested a positive value of "end the war" under retaliation of
+ 1000. This reflects the positive value of stopping Soviet aggression, but
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since this also is accompanied by the effects US nuclear retaliation
(particularly to adjacent nations that are not part of the conflict), this
outcome has a lower value than does "end the war" under no retaliation. I
have rated the outcome "end the war" under no retaliation higher than "end
the war" under retaliation since the nuclear aggression would come to an
end without further nuclear attacks.
We can see from the calculations in Table 2.4 that if the Soviets did
launch a nuclear first strike, in spite of the US policy of deterrence, then the
action of not retaliating would be morally right and retaliation would be
morally wrong. Therefore, it seems that there can be plausible
circumstances such that, according to the principle of maximization of total
expected utility, it can be morally right to adopt a deterrent policy that
includes the conditional intention to retaliate and be morally wrong to
retaliate should the specified conditions occur.
Disaster Avoidance
The Disaster Avoidance Principle (DAP) that I presented earlier can
easily be adapted to moral questions by considering the potential disasters in
terms of the total expected negative utility they would produce rather than
just the negative utility expected for the agent. In Kavka's presentation of
DAP in "Deterrence, Utility and Rational Choice, " he is concerned with the
moral status of nuclear deterrence and considers the total amount of utility
for each potential disaster in his application of DAP. We can formulate this
version of DAP as follows:
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DAP: when choosing between potential disasters under two-dimensional
uncertainty, the alternative that minimizes the probability of disaster
occurrence is morally right.
1 will again consider that the alternative actions being considered are
the policies of nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament. The potential
disaster from the former being a Soviet nuclear first strike and the potential
disaster from the latter being Soviet domination. As I've explained earlier,
"two-dimensional uncertainty" refers to the claim that we do not have
reliable estimates of the probabilities or the utility measurements for either
of these disasters. There seems to be no natural reference class of past
situations or scientific theories of international relations that could provide
us with relative frequencies of nuclear war given nuclear deterrence of the
type now practiced, or of the probability of Soviet domination given US
nuclear disarmament in the present world situation.
Kavka does claim, however, that we can judge the ordinal ranking of the
utilities and the probabilities of the disasters. We can judge that the death
and destruction in the US, plus the nuclear effects to other nations, from a
Soviet nuclear first strike would be a worse disaster in terms of total utility
than would domination by the Soviets. Likewise, we can argue that the
probability of a Soviet first strike under deterrence is less than the
probability of Soviet domination given US nuclear disarmament. If these
assumptions are correct, we are left with the decision between a lesser
chance of a worse disaster and a greater chance of a lesser disaster.
Therefore, according to the DAP, adoption of a deterrence policy is the
morally right action because it carries the lesser probability of disaster
occurrence.
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Let s now assume that despite the lesser probability of disaster, the
Soviets launch a nuclear first strike. The US is now faced with a different set
of alternative actions, namely, retaliation or no retaliation. It seems
plausible to assume that the potential disaster from retaliation is repeated
nuclear exchanges between the US and the Soviets from retaliation, counter-
retaliation, counter-counter-retaliation, etc., until all the missiles have been
fired. On the other hand, the potential disaster from not retaliating would be
Soviet world domination. I think that we can judge that the potetial disaster
of all-out nuclear war is a worse disaster than Soviet domination in terms of
total utility.
The probability that retaliation will add to the worldwide nuclear
devastation is certain (unless all the missiles were duds), and the chance of
additional Soviet strikes after US retaliation is probably very high. While the
chance of Soviet domination after no retaliation is probably relatively high,
it could be reasonably judged as less than the chance of greater nuclear
devastation from retaliation. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the
probability of the disaster of all-out war is greater than that of Soviet
domination. We are left with a situation where the greater disaster also
carries with it the greater probability, thus, the morally right action is no
retaliation.
I’m not not making the claim that these ordinal judgments are true. My
claim is that the judgments are made based on plausible combinations of
circumstances and values that could be true. Thus, it can be consistent
according to the Disaster Avoidance Principle for the conditional intention
to retaliate to be morally right and the act of retaliation to be morally wrong.
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested an argument with the
premise "If retaliation is wrong (irrational) then the conditional intention
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to retaliate is wrong (irrational). I then suggested that the potential
consequences of forming the conditional intention to retaliate (e.g.,
prevention of nuclear war) may be sufficient for it to be right. Thus, the
paradox: that the conditional intention to retaliate seems to be right and it
seems to be wrong.
This apparent paradox forces us to examine more closely the reasoning
that leads to these opposed conclusions about the normative status of the
conditional intention to retaliate. In this chapter, I have concentrated on the
line of reasoning that concludes that the conditional intention to retaliate
can be right, based on the potential desirable consequences resulting from
its formation. This is not a claim about the actual values and probabilities of
the nuclear deterrence policy practiced by the US. Rather, it is the claim that
there can be plausible circumstances such that the same principle will hold
that the conditional intention to retaliate can be right while the act of
retalition is wrong. Whether the current world situation is an example of
such a set of circumstances is a different question.
From the examples I have suggested, I think that we can identify a
number of significant characteristics of the nuclear deterrence issue that
come to light by applying these consequentialist principles:
1. It seems clear to me that nuclear deterrence, specifically the
deterrence practiced by the US, must be characterized as primarily two
separate actions. One action is the formation of the conditional intention to
retaliate and the second action is the retaliation itself. This would be
contrasted with a type of deterrence that was characterized by the activation
of an automatic retaliation machine that would automatically launch a
nuclear retaliation once it detected a nuclear attack, and that once turned on.
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could never be turned off. Under this type of deterrence, only one action is
required, i.e., turning on the machine. The action of turning on the machine
includes both the deterrent intention to retaliate and the action of
retaliating if attacked. The deterrence policy of the US, however, is not like
this. US deterrence includes one action to adopt the policy, and then would
require a second, separate action of retaliation.
2. The actions of formation of the conditional intention and the action of
retaliation each have independent utility values. In other words, the utility
value associated with forming the conditional intention to retaliate does not
derive from or include any positive or negative utility values of retaliation.
3. Each of the two actions has a unique set of outcomes. These different
outcomes reflect the different purposes and intentions for doing each action.
As we saw in the examples in this chapter, the desired result, or intention, of
forming the conditional intention to retaliate is prevention of a Soviet first
strike. On the other hand, the action considered if deterrence fails
(retaliation) will be for the purpose of ending the war, limiting nuclear
damage, or preventing Soviet world domination.
4. It is clear that within the framework of each of the consequentialist
principles that I have considered, it can be consistent for the conditional
intention to do an act to have a normative status that is different from the
normative status of the act itself. It’s interesting to note that when we apply
purely consequentialist principles to the case of nuclear deterrence, and get
results where an intention to do an act is right, but the act itself is wrong, we
do not perceive that a paradox arises. I suspect that this is due to the points
that I have listed above. By viewing the action of formation of the
conditional intention as a separate act from the act of retaliation, and by
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realizing that the formation of the intention carries with it its own utility
value, we see no problem in situations where, according to consequentialist
principles it may be right to intend to do an act that is wrong.
5. I think that the consequentialist principles that I have discussed in
this chapter fail to address whether there is some type of special relationship
between an action and the intention to do the action. The argument that I
presented at the beginning of this chapter relied on just such a relationship,
namely that if an action is wrong then the intention to do the action is also
wrong, regardless of its consequences.
From the examples in this chapter, it seems that the line of reasoning,
based on consequentialist principles, that concludes that the conditional
intention to retaliate can be right even when the retaliation itself is wrong
is plausible. Thus, we must now examine the line of reasoning, based on
relevant non-consequentialist principles, that suggests that if retaliation is
wrong then the conditional intention to retaliate must also be wrong. This




We saw in chapter 2 that one of the lines of reasoning that leads to
paradox- the line of reasoning that concludes that the conditional intention
to retaliate is right based on its consequences, seems plausible (I refer to this
as the consequentialist line of reasoning). It seems that there can be
reasonable circumstances under which a consequentialist principle will
hold that the conditional intention to retaliate is morally right (rational) and
the act of retaliation is morally wrong (irrational). Yet this result depends
importantly on the claim that formation of the conditional intention to
retaliate and the retaliation are two independent actions. Because we view
the issue as an evaluation of two independent actions, we assume that there
will be two separate utility values. Thus, there is no conflict in a situation
where one action is evaluated as right and the other action as wrong.
There is, however, a second line of reasoning about this conditional
intention that conflicts with the consequentialist account to form the
paradox. The reasoning here depends on appeal to moral principles which
hold that the action of retaliation, and the action of forming the conditional
intention to retaliate are not independent actions, but are related in an
important way. This line of reasoning is non-consequentialist in that the
moral principles assumed, and according to which the normative statuses of
actions are determined, appeal to features of the actions other than their
consequences. In the case of nuclear deterrence, the action of nuclear
retaliation is determined to be morally wrong according to a specified, non-
consequentialist moral principle. The conditional intention to retaliate is
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then determined to be morally wrong by appeal to a non-consequentialist
moral principle which holds that it is wrong to intend (even conditionally)
to do an action that is itself wrong. In both cases, the normative statuses of
the actions are determined according to moral principles that appeal to
features of actions other than their consequences. (I refer to this as the
non-consequentialist line of reasoning).
Based on these moral principles, and some assumptions about nuclear
retaliation, the non-consequentialist line of reasoning concludes that
nuclear retaliation is morally wrong and therefore, the conditional
intention to retaliate is also morally wrong. In this chapter, I want to
examine more closely the principles, assumptions and arguments required
for this line of reasoning to work, in order to see whether there is the same
degree of plausibility in application of this line of reasoning as we had in
the application of the consequentialist principles.
A typical non-consequentialist evaluation of nuclear deterrence
includes two moral principles and one assumption. These are:
The Principle of Discrimination : The deliberate killing of non-
combatants is morally wrong.
The Wrongful Intentions Principle (WIP) : It is morally wrong to intend
what it is morally wrong to do.
Assumption : Nuclear retaliation requires the deliberate killing of non-
combatants.
With these principles and the assumption, an argument can be
formulated to show that nuclear retaliation is morally wrong. Such an
argument might be as follows:
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Argument Al:
1. The deliberate killing of non-combatants is morally wrong
2. Nuclear retaliation requires the deliberate killing of non-
combatants
3. If an act, A, is morally wrong, and another act, B, requires A, then B
is also morally wrong.
4. Therefore, nuclear retaliation is morally wrong.
5. It is morally wrong to intend (even conditionally) to do what is itself
morally wrong.
6. Therefore, the conditional intention to retaliate is morally wrong.
If we were to add a premise such as, "Nuclear deterrence is the
conditional intention to retaliate," then we could also draw the conclusion
that nuclear deterrence is morally wrong. The argument is valid, but we
must examine the truth of the premises to determine its soundness. Before I
turn to discussion of the premises, I first want to note some other versions of
this argument.
One variation of Al can be formulated by using the Principle of
Proportionality in place of the Principle of Discrimination. The Principle of
Proportionality asserts that a military action would be morally wrong if the
number of innocent civilians killed by the action exceeded what would be
proportional to the military value of the action. The reasoning of this
version of Al is that the great number of civilians that would be killed as a
result of the use of nuclear weapons against a particular target will always
exceed what would be proportional to the military value of that target.
Thus, premise 1 of A 1 is replaced by "1. A military action is morally
wrong if the number of innocent civilians killed by the action exceeds what
would be proportional to the military value of the action." and premise 2 is
replaced by, " 2. The number of innocent civilians killed by nuclear
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retaliation exceeds the number that would be proportional to the military
value of nuclear retaliation." The rest of the argument remains the same,
resulting in the conclusions that the conditional intention to retaliate is
morally wrong and therefore, nuclear deterrence is morally wrong.
There is another variation of the non-consequentialist argument that I
also want to mention. Instead of the WIP, this argument uses the Wrongful
Threats Principle (WTP): That it is wrong to threaten to do an act that is
itself wrong . This principle has been defended by David Hoekema. He
argues against Kavka's discussion of intentions, noting that,
"...Kavka fails to recognize that the WIP does not bear as directly as he
supposes on deterrent situations. For it is not the intentions that deter, as
Kavka supposes, but threats."^
"In the characteristic case of conditional threats, one person threatens
another because she wants him to act in a certain way. What has this effect,
if the threat succeeds, is the threat itself— the declared intention to do
harm." 1 7
I think that Hoekema is correct in claiming that it is threats, rather than
simple intentions, that have deterrent effect. However, he then makes the
claim that,
"A threat is the declaration of an intention to do harm, and in order to be
effective the declaration must be credible. But whether the threatener
actually holds such an intention is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the
threat." * 8
16Hoekema, David, "The Moral Status of Nuclear Deterrent Threats," Social Philosophy




I think that this claim does not hold in the case of nuclear deterrence.
Kemp has noted that a deterrent threat could be accompanied by any of three
possible intentional states. First, the threat to do an act could be accompanied
by the conditional intention to do the act if the threat is unsuccessful in
deterring the unwanted action. Second, the threat could be accompanied by a
secret intention not to do the act if the threat is unsuccessful in deterring
the unwanted act. Thus, the threat would be a bluff. Finally, the threat might
not be accompanied by any formed intention at all. The agent simply might
not know what he would do if the threat is unsuccessful in deterring the
unwanted action. 19
As I've discussed in Chapter 1, given the organization of the US military
and the US industrial base, I don't think that the US could keep secret the fact
that the threat was a bluff. If it became known that the threat to retaliate was
a bluff, then clearly it would have no deterrent value.
Likewise, it has been claimed that for the deterrent to be effective, we
must convince the opponent that there is no question that retaliation will
take place and that it will result in unacceptable consequences.20 In order
for this to be accomplished, the opponent must believe that the agent will
retaliate, and has the capability to retaliate effectively. This requires that the
agent develop and stockpile appropriate weapons systems, develop
procedures and strategies for their use, select targets, and train personnel to
use them. I don't think that these tasks could be accomplished, particularly
in a manner that would effectively deter an opponent, if the agent did not
form the sincere intention to retaliate.
19 Kemp, p. 277-8
^Secretary of Defense Weinberger, "To maintain a sound deterrent, we must make clear
to our adversary that we would decisively and effectively answer his attack," Annual
Report to Congress, FY 1984, February 1, 1983
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Thus, in the case of nuclear deterrence, I want to claim that for the
threat to retaliate to be credible and effective, it must be accompanied by the
sincere intention to retaliate. Contrary to Hoekema's claim, I think that
whether or not the threatener forms the sincere intention to retaliate is
vitally important to the effectiveness of the threat.
It should also be noted that if these threats would not successfully deter
the Soviet Union, then it is unlikely that either threat would have the best
expected consequences of the alternative actions available to prevent
nuclear attack. Therefore, neither would be morally right according to the
consequentialist line of reasoning, and we find that the paradox fades away.
For nuclear deterrence to be credible and effective, and for paradoxical
deterrence to arise, the threat to retaliate must be accompanied by the
sincere intention to retaliate. Likewise, the sincere intention to retaliate
must be expressed as a declared intention, or threat, in order to influence an
opponent. I am more interested in the implications of forming the intention
to retaliate, and how such an intention leads to paradoxical deterrence. Thus,
instead of threats I will concentrate on the intention to retaliate and the
argument that utilizes the WIP, as representative of the non-consequentialist
line of reasoning (and will assume that this intention is expressed as a
threat). I suspect that my discussion will apply similarly to threats and
arguments utilizing the WTP.
An objection might be raised to premise 2, of Al, that retaliation requires
the deliberate killing of innocents, by claiming that nuclear retaliation is an
attack against legitimate military targets. Any innocent civilians that are
killed is a result of unintended effects of the legitimate military attack, and
thus, retaliation does not require the deliberate killing of innocents. I think
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that there are two responses to this objection. One response is to accept the
objection to premise 2, but then offer the version of A1 that utilizes the
principle of proportionality that I've discussed above. In this versiion of Al,
even nuclear weapons fired at specific, legitimate, military targets will be
morally wrong.
Another response to this objection is to point out that nuclear retaliation
does indeed require the deliberate killing of innocent civilians. It is the very
fact that innocent civilians will be killed, and the vast number that will be
killed, that is supposed to have the deterrent effect on the opposing
government. Therefore, I think that we can accept premise 2 of Al.
There seems to be much intuitive support for arguments such as Al that
utilize the Wrongful Intentions Principle. We can think of many cases where
it seems true that it is wrong to intend to do an act that itself is wrong. Yet, I
think that there are some interesting claims that suggest that the
conclusions of Al, and the applicability of the WIP, are not quite so obvious. I
want to present two such arguments.
One argument, suggested by Jonathan Schonsheck,^ 1 acknowledges
that Al can be used to argue against nuclear deterrence. He claims, however,
that although formation of the intention to retaliate is morally wrong
according to Al (based primarily on application of the WIP), the argument
does not show conclusively that the intention to retaliate is morally wrong.
His argument suggests that the moral evaluation rendered by Al may be
overridden by other considerations or other moral principles that may
apply.
21 Schonsheck, Jonathan, "Wrongful Threats, Wrongful Intentions, and Moral Judgments
About Nuclear Weapons Policies," Monist. 70, p. 330-356
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I then want to present an argument by Kavka for the claim that there
are peculiar characteristics in the case of nuclear deterrence such that the
WIP should not be applied in the normative evaluation of the conditional
intention to retaliate. Once these characteristics are identified, it becomes
clear that the factors that made WIP applicable to most intentions, and that
make it intuitively acceptable, are not present in the case of nuclear
deterrence.
Schonsheck does not argue specifically for the moral permissibility of
nuclear deterrence, but rather against the immediate rejection of deterrence
based on the WIP and the claim that retaliation is morally wrong. He suggests
that we must specify more carefully the role that principles such as the WIP
play in making judgments about actions.
Schonsheck suggests that there are two "understandings" of the role that
non-consequentialist principles play in the moral assessments of actions.
First, is what he calls the "conclusive understanding." According to this
understanding, "a finding that some action would violate some non-
consequentialist moral principle is sufficient for the action's being wrong,
for its being morally impermissible.
2
For example, arguments such as A1 make the case that retaliation is
wrong, and then by appeal to the WIP, conclude that the conditional
intention to retaliate is morally wrong. These arguments suggest that the
WIP, and the premise that retaliation is wrong, comprise a decisive case.
They hold that the WIP is an absolute principle, and thus, forming the
conditional intention is wrong regardless of the consequences and
regardless of any other moral principles that may apply to the action.
22Schonsheck, p. 333
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He then contrasts the "conclusive understanding" with what he calls the
Prima Facie understanding. According to this understanding,
that an action would violate some non-consequentialist principle
counts against that action, constitutes a moral impediment to its
permissibility. However, that the action would violate such a principle does
not establish conclusively that the action is wrong, that it is morally
impermissible for a person to do it. "2
3
Schonsheck suggests a number of reasons that we may prefer the
Prima Facie" understanding to the "conclusive" understanding. It may be
that in the particular moral choice situation that a person finds himself,
every available alternative may violate a non-consequentialist principle. If
some alternative must be selected (and even not selecting one of the
available alternatives would violate a non-consequentialist principle), then
some principle must be violated. In such a situation, it seems that the only
recourse is to claim that some violations must be better or worse than others.
If this is the case, it would be premature to condemn an action for its being a
principle violation before we examined what principles would be violated,
and how they would be violated, by the available alternatives to the action.
We might also think of this in terms of duties. Thus, if there is a moral
principle that specifies that a person should do action A under certain
morally relevant circumstances, then we could say that the person has a duty
to do action A under those circumstances. But can we conclude from this that
action A is the action that the person ought to do? It seems not. For one can
imagine a variety of circumstances where more than one moral principle
may apply in a given situation, creating conflicting duties. It may be that
one duty can be fulfilled only by neglecting another.24 Under these
23Schonsheck, p. 333
55
circumstances, it seems that one must determine which duty is more
important, or more pressing, and act to fulfill that duty.
Once a person has found himself in a situation of conflicting duties, and
chosen to act in accordance with the duty determined to be the most
important, Schonsheck asks what can we say about the choice. He notes that
we can point to the duty not fulfilled and conclude that the person failed to
satisfy some duty. Or we can look to the duty that was fulfilled and the
person’s reasoning for determining that that duty was the one that should be
followed. Schonsheck argues that,
"If we agree that the moral agent in question did in fact find himself or
herself in a situation of conflicting duties, it is incomplete and morally
untoward to merely point out the duty unfulfilled, neglecting the mention of
the duty that was in fact fulfilled, and the reasons of the agent for believing
that that was the more important duty. ”2 5
One can certainly question and debate the reasons and evidence the
moral agent used for determining which was the more important duty. But to
simply point to a duty in isolation, note that it was not fulfilled, and then
claim that the action was wrong, seems to be an incomplete moral evaluation
of the action and the agent.
Schonsheck uses terminology suggested by W.D. Ross to talk about these




"When a moral rule of the duty-specifying sort applies to a person, that
person is said to have a prima facie duty to perform the action specified by
that rule. ...But while a reason, it is not in isolation a conclusive reason.
There may be another duty-specifying moral rule which applies to the
person in his/her circumstances; it too yields a prima facie duty. The right-
acting person fulfills the more pressing duty.... The more important duty is
called one's duty all things considered. A person in these circumstances is
not culpable, or less virtuous, for having left the other (ex hypothesi) less
pressing duty unfulfilled."2 6
He also suggests that we can use this terminology of "prima facie" duty
and duty "all things considered" mutatis mutandis as regards "wrongs."
Thus, an agent may be in a situation such that each available alternative is a
violation of some moral principle, i.e., each alternative is prima facie
morally wrong. In such a situation, it seems that since all the alternatives
are "wrong," the right thing to do is to choose that action that is "least
wrong." Thus, what the agent ought to choose will be prima facie wrong, but
will be the right thing to do, all things considered.
Schonsheck notes that,
"Whatever is selected will still be wrong in the prima facie sense; that it
is a rule violation does not change, and there is still moral reason against its
selection. However, it is true (ex hypothesi) that the moral case against the
other alternatives is stronger, and it that fact that justifies the selection." 2 2
Thus, one immediately apparent difficulty with the non-consequentialist
line of reasoning that relies on Al, is that it focuses solely on the WIP to
determine the normative status of the conditional intention to retaliate. It
presents an argument to show that retaliation is morally wrong, and then




wrong because it violates the WIP. Yet it does not present relevant arguments
to show that other non-consequentialist principles, that may apply to the
conditional intention, are less pressing and should be passed over in favor of
the WIP.
Objections to Schonsheck's argument might take a number of forms. For
example, if one's moral system consisted solely of the Wrongful Intentions
Principle, then there would be no concern about application of other moral
principles to the conditional intention. One would simply apply the WIP, so to
speak, and get a normative evaluation of the conditional intention. Yet such
a moral system is clearly absurd, for one would not even be able to determine
the normative status of the act itself, since the WIP only makes a claim about
intentions.
One might also claim that the WIP was the preeminent principle of their
moral system. Thus, there would be no other moral principle in the system
that could override the evaluation rendered by the WIP. If someone
subscribed to such a system, then once it was determined that the conditional
intention was wrong according to the WIP, no other principle would have to
be applied to the intention since it is stipulated that no other principle would
override the WIP. This again seems to be a rather absurd moral system.
Finally, it might be claimed that one's moral system was so complete and
consistent that conflicts among its principles were not possible. Thus, once
an action was determined to violate one of the principles, it could be rejected
without consideration of any other principles in the system.
Unless one subscribes to a moral system of one of these types, it seems
possible that an agent may Find himself or herself in a situation where he or
she has to choose between alternatives each of which violates some non-
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consequentialist principle. If this is true, then it seems that rejecting any of
the alternatives prior to a full evaluation of all the alternatives is premature
and unwarranted.
Anthony Kenny subscribes to a moral system of divine law, in which
presumably there could not be conflicts of duty. In this system, were one to
determine that an action violated a divine law, then one can immediately
reject the action as wrong. Kenny argues that, "One of the actions prohibited
by divine law is the intentional killing of the innocent. "28 He then notes
that the,
"...NATO defence policy involves a readiness to commit murder on a
gigantic scale. The intention to do so is admittedly a conditional one. But one
may not intend even conditionally to do what is forbidden absolutely.
9
"We must give up our nuclear deterrent not because by so doing we shall
achieve some desirable aim, but because to retain it is wicked. What will then
follow is not in our hands. The prospect of standing defenceless before
Communist Russia is indeed a sombre one. But that does not justify us in
covenanting with the NATO powers to commit murder."^ 0
Kenny is using two important principles in his argument that nuclear
deterrence should be rejected. First is a divine law that killing innocents is
absolutely forbidden. Second, is the WIP. These principles, with the
assumption that nuclear retaliation is killing of the innocent, yield the
conclusion that nuclear deterrence is absolutely forbidden.
Kenny does not directly address the distinction between "prima facie"
wrongs and "all things considered" wrongs. He suggests in the passages
28Kenny, Anthony, "Counterforce and Countervalue" in The Ivorv Tower. Basil Blackwell




above that once it is established that an action violates a divine law, then it
can be rejected. It seems that Kenny also must hold that it is not possible
within his system for there to be a conflict between divine laws. Thus, he
must assent to the claim that absolutely nothing could justify "covenanting
to commit murder."
It seems possible, however, to imagine cases that show conflicts between
divine laws, or at least what humans might perceive to be conflicts between
divine laws. In such a case, it would still seem warranted to consider the
other available alternatives, since our perception that the act we are about to
reject violates a divine law could also be confused. Even after such
consideration, it might still appear that there are conflicts between the
divine laws in a given situation.
For example, suppose one has a nuclear deterrent policy in place.
Suppose it's also the case that the conditional intention to retaliate is the best
and most effective means with which to keep a hostile, nuclear armed
opponent from attacking. To switch to a policy of nuclear disarmament will
bring about a nuclear attack on the agent's nation, killing millions of
innocent citizens. It seems that the action of nuclear disarmament is
absolutely forbidden. But according to Kenny’s argument, continuing the
policy of deterrence is also forbidden. Kenny's argument does not address
how we should choose between these undesirable alternatives.
I don't wish to debate the moral system of divine law. But it strikes me
that it is possible to conceive of situations where there seem to be conflicts
among divine laws, or at least where we perceive the divine laws to yield
conflicting results. In such cases, it seems more reasonable to consider all
the available alternatives, and select the one that seems "least wrong", rather
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than pointing to a principle or divine law in isolation, note that the action
violates this one law, and then reject the action.
It s also interesting to note that Kenny does not provide any arguments
in support of the WIP. He does assert that killing the innocent violates divine
law. But he provides no justification for the claim that if an act is wrong,
then intending to do the act must also wrong. Although this is a crucial
premise in the evaluation of the conditional intention, he does not argue for
the principle.
Kenny's divine law moral system may be consistent enough so that there
cannot be conflicts between divine laws. Yet many philosophers who cite
arguments such as A1 are not arguing from a divine law moral system. Thus,
Schonsheck's argument that it is premature to dismiss the conditional
intention to retaliate without a full appraisal of all the available alternatives
is important.
I think that Schonsheck's claim, that one should pursue an evaluation of
the conditional intention to retaliate, all things considered
,
rather than
rejecting it once we determine it is prima facie wrong is plausible. Thus, I
think that we have a potentially important objection to the non-
consequentialist line of reasoning that rejects the conditional intention to
retaliate. This is not to conclude that the conditional intention is morally
right. Rather, it is the claim that A1 is not sufficient to declare that the
conditional intention to retaliate is morally wrong. A1 would have to be
paired with further arguments to show that the alternatives to nuclear
deterrence were "less wrong."
A different type of objection against A1 concentrates on rejecting
premise 4, the Wrongful Intentions Principle. This is the premise that is
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particularly relevant to paradoxical deterrence, thus, for the sake of my
discussion, I will assume that retaliation may be morally wrong (based on
lines 1-3 of Al).31 What I am interested in is whether we can make the move
at premise 4, of Al, which leads to the conclusion that the conditional
intention to retaliate is morally wrong solely on the basis of the act of
retaliation being morally wrong. This is the premise that is required to make
the non-consequentialist argument work, but it is, I think, open to serious
objection.
Arguments such as Al seem persuasive primarily because the WIP seems
obviously true. Gregory Kavka has noted that, "WIP seems so obvious that,
although philosophers never call it into question, they rarely bother to
assert it or argue for it."32 It also seems that the WIP may apply to
conditional intentions in the same manner as it does non-conditional
intentions. Kavka has noted that,
"Suppose I form the intention to kill my neighbor if he insults me again,
and fail to kill him only because, fortuitously, he refrains from doing so. I
am as bad, or nearly as bad, as if he had insulted me and I killed him. My
failure to perform the act no more erases the wrongness of my intention,
than my neighbor's dropping dead as I load my gun would negate the
wrongness of the simple intention to kill him." 3 3
But why does the WIP seem true? It may be that many people associate
the intention to do an act with the desire to do the act. Thus, one might claim
that as a desire to do evil is evil, so the intention to do evil is also evil.
31 Retaliation, under certain circumstances, might be morally right. If it were, however,
there would be no paradox. Thus, the philosophically interesting cases are those where
retaliation is morally wrong, but the status of the intention to retaliate is in question.
32Kavka, Some Paradoxes of Deterrence", p. 289
33Kavka, p. 289
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Similarly, many people may think that by forming the intention to do evil,
one is taking actions to make the evil act come about. This also seems to make
the intention evil. Some people may also think that the formation of the
intention is in some way the start of the act itself. For example, Kavka
suggests that one reason people may regard the WIP as true is that,
"...it is convenient, for many purposes, to treat a prior intention to
perform an act, as the beginning of the act itself. Hence we are inclined to
view intentions as parts of actions and to ascribe to each intention the moral
status ascribed to the act "containing" it." 34
It's unclear whether Kavka actually holds this view or whether he is
simply suggesting it as an explanation of why some people may believe the
WIP to be true. In either case the view seems wrong. In the passage above, he
seems to be suggesting two claims. First, he is suggesting that the intention
to do an act should be considered as the beginning part of the act itself. If
this claim were true, then in the case of nuclear deterrence, we would have
to say that when the conditional intention to retaliate which was formed
almost 40 years ago, the act of retaliation was begun, and apparently has
been in progress ever since. This seems to be a rather absurd claim.
This claim seems particularly implausible in the case of conditional
intentions, where a conditional intention is formed at one time, but the act
occurs, if it ever occurs, at a much later time. Likewise, we can think of
many sincere intentions that are formed but where the act never occurs.
Either the intention is abandoned before the act occurs, or, as in the case of
conditional intentions, the antecedent condition of the conditional intention
just never obtains. Thus, it seems incorrect to claim that the intention to do
an act is the beginning of the act.
34Kavka, p. 289
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The second claim suggested by Kavka's remarks is that, as a "part" of an
evil act, the intention to do the act must also be evil. There seem to be many
cases where this does not hold. A murderer's act of murder would then have
to include as a "part" the intention to murder as well as other "parts" such as
driving his car to the murder site, obeying traffic laws, walking down a
street, etc. If this second claim were true, then each of these "parts" must be
labeled morally wrong if the act of murder is wrong. But it seems absurd in
this case to claim that the acts of driving a car and obeying traffic laws are
morally wrong. Thus it seems that both claims, that the intention to do an act
is the beginning that act and that the intention must have the same
normative status as the act of which it is a "part," are implausible.
The confusion in these cases may stem from the fact that in most cases
the only noticeable effects of the intention to do an act is the occurrence of
the act itself (and the consequences of the act) This may cause some people to
accept that the intention is part of the act or should be given the same
normative status as the act.
Many of these reasons that make the WIP seem true are not present in
the case of nuclear deterrence. Kavka and others^ have argued that the
WIP should not be applied to the case of nuclear deterrence because the
conditional intention to retaliate present in nuclear deterrence policies has
such unique characteristics that the WIP is not applicable to it. Thus, Kavka
rejects premise 4 of Al.
35Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," and for example, David Gauthier,
"Deterrence, Maximization and Rationality," Ethics . 94, April 1984; Kenneth Kemp,
"Nuclear Deterrence and the Morality of Intentions," Monist . 70, Russell Hardin, "Risking
Armageddon," in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity, ed. by Avner Cohen and
Steven Lee, Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Allanheld, 1986, pp. 201-223
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As I've noted, WIP seems intuitively appealing because we usually think
that when an agent forms an intention to do an act, even a conditional
intention, the agent desires to do the act. We may also believe that the
purpose of forming the intention is to make the action come about. Finally, it
may be that the only consequence of forming the intention is the bringing
about of the act itself. In these cases, little importance attaches to the
distinction between the intention and the intention of the intention. 3 6
Kavka has argued, however, that this is not the case with the conditional
intention to retaliate in nuclear deterrence. The ground of the desire to form
the intention is entirely distinct from any desire to carry out the intention.
The purpose, or intention, of the conditional intention is as a means of
deterrence, not as the first step in carrying out the act of retaliation. Kavka
argues,
"He desires having the intention as a means of deterrence. Also, he is
willing, in order to prevent the offense, to accept a certain risk that, in the
end, he will apply the sanction. But this is entirely consistent with his
having a strong desire not to apply the sanction, and no desire at all to apply
it. Thus, while the object of his deterrent intention might be an evil act, it
does not follow that, in desiring to adopt that intention, he desires to do evil,
either as an end or as a means.
^
This argument points to the fact that there are effects from the
conditional intention that are distinct from the effects of the act intended. In
most cases, the only significant effects of an intention that can be identified
are those of the doing of the action and the consequences of the action. Thus,
if evil actions are intended that would produce evil consequences, the only
36Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," p. 291
37 Kavka, p. 291
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noticeable effects of forming the intention are the evil action itself and the
evil consequences.
Again we find that this is not the case with the conditional intention to
retaliate. The agent believes that forming the conditional intention will have
a particular and significant effect, namely, prevention of a nuclear first
strike by his opponent. This effect is completely independent of any effect
that would result from retaliation. Kavka has called these the "autonomous
effects"^ 8 0 f the deterrent intention. The autonomous effects of the
conditional intention to retaliate are specifically the influence that having
the intention will have on the agent's opponent's behavior. It seems that
these autonomous effects are relevant to the normative evaluation of the
formation of the intention. The WIP, however, evaluates the intention solely
on the effects of doing the action and the consequences of doing the action,
while ignoring the effects of the forming of the intention itself.
The interesting, and unusual, features of these autonomous effects in the
case of the conditional intention to retaliate is the belief that the autonomous
effects of forming the intention will insure that the action of retaliation
will never happen. The conditional intention to retaliate is formed in the
belief that it will prevent the antecedent condition of the conditional
intention from occurring. Normally we think that an intention initiates of
sequence of events that have as their expected result the performance of the
action that was intended. But in the case of nuclear deterrence, the
conditional intention is formed in the belief that it will prevent
performance of the action that was intended. Thus, we might describe the
38 Kavka, p. 291
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conditional intention to retaliate as a self-defeating intention; the effects of
the intention will make it unnecessary to do the action intended.
In forming the conditional intention, the agent believes that it will
influence his opponent's behavior (prevent him from launching a first
strike) and thus, will prevent the antecedent condition of the conditional
from ever obtaining. With these points in mind, it's misguided to assess the
normative status of the intention to do an act solely in terms of the
normative status of the act. Rather, it seems that the normative evaluation
should be made of the conditional intention as an act in itself. The WIP,
however, attaches the normative status of the act to the intention to do the
act.
Kemp cites an objection offered by John Finnis to the claim that this
self-defeating characteristic is relevant to the evaluation of the conditional
intention. 39 Finnis supposes that a group of bank robbers, fearing the
consequences of committing homicide, might nonetheless decide to shoot if
their robbery is interfered with, and may even judge that the chances of any
interference will be minimized if they make threats with their guns. They
may believe that these threats will have the effect of influencing the bank
employees' behavior such that the antecedent condition of their threat ("if
anyone tries to stop us") will never be realized. But they still intend to shoot
if their threat fails to prevent interference in their robbery. The claim here
is that these threats, and their associated conditional intentions, are still
wrong even though they have similar characteristics as are claimed for
nuclear deterrence.
39Finnis, John, and Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, (manuscript)
cited in Kemp, "Nuclear deterrence and the Morality of Intentions," p. 291
67
Kemp notes, however, that there are some important differences. First,
the bank robbers are using the threats as a means to completion of an evil
project, namely the robbing of a bank. Whatever the assessment of nuclear
deterrence itself, it seems uncontroversial that its goal, or project,
specifically the protection of the Western democracies from nuclear attack,
is at least a prima facie moral imperative. Thus, we have good reason to
condemn the bank robbers.
The second difference is that the conditionally intended killing plays
different roles in the two cases. The bank robbers' project is to get away with
the money. Actual killing may be necessary to achieve that end. If their
deterrent fails, performance of the intended killing will still contribute to
the successful completion of their project. Their choice is either to kill to
achieve their goal or to surrender. In the case of the agent practicing
deterrence, however, the conditionally intended killing is not similarly
related to his end or goal. His goal is the prevention of a nuclear first strike.
Once a first strike has occurred, performing the conditionally intended
killing does not serve to further his goal of preventing a nuclear first strike.
He has already failed in achieving his goal. It was the intention alone that
promoted his end, through the autonomous effects he believed it to have on
his opponent. Kemp argues that,
"Given that the deaths of innocents (as opposed to the intention to kill
them) serves no purpose of theirs [those who practice nuclear deterrence],
and is not chosen as a means to some further goal at which they aim, it is not
possible to say even about the maintainers of anti-city deterrent the things




41 Kemp, p. 292
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In the case of most intentions it might seem pointless to adopt an
intention that is self-defeating because in most intentions the agent desires
to perform the intended action. The conditional intention included in
nuclear deterrence seems to be an exception. It's not pointless because we
desire the autonomous effects of having the intention. This makes it worth
forming the conditional intention to retaliate even if we believe that it will
insure that the object of the intention is never performed.
It seems to me that when we examine the conditional intention to
retaliate more closely, we find that many of the characteristics commonly
associated with intentions, characteristics that make the WIP intuitively
appealing, are not present. In the case of nuclear deterrence, there is no
desire to do the act of retaliation. The formation of the conditional intention
creates effects that are independent of doing the action intended and the
consequences that would result from the doing the action. These independent
effects are of immense value (prevention of nuclear war). Finally, the
conditional intention is self-defeating; if it is successful, the object of the
intention will never be performed. If it is unsuccessful, and a first strike
occurs, it does not further the agent's project to do the retaliation. Because
the intention behind forming the conditional intention is so completely
oriented towards the effects of having the intention, and not with desiring
the object of the intention (retaliation), I think it is misguided to evaluate
the normative status of forming the conditional intention solely on the
normative status of retaliation itself.
All of these factors combine to make application of the WIP to nuclear
deterrence very implausible. The non-consequentialist line of reasoning
may still hold that retaliation is morally wrong because it violates absolute
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principles such as the Principle of Discrimination or the Principle of
Proportionality. But the non-consequentialist line of reasoning that rejects
forming the conditional intention to retaliate also requires the WIP as a key
premise in its argument. If the WIP is shown to be not true, or shown not to
apply to intentions that are part of a nuclear deterrent policy, then the non-
consequentialist argument fails and no paradox arises.
I think that the non-consequentialist line of reasoning is very
questionable due to its reliance on the WIP in its argument against nuclear
deterrence. I don't know if the unique characteristics of the conditional
intention to retaliate demonstrate conclusively that the WIP is not true and
should be abandoned completely. Yet I think that it does suggest that there
are cases where the WIP should not be applied because it fails to account for
all of the relevant moral factors required to make an accurate and plausible
normative evaluation. The conditional intention to retaliate that is part of a




My purpose in this thesis has been to focus on a paradox found in some
types of nuclear deterrence. The paradox arises specifically in the normative
evaluation of the act of forming the conditional intention to retaliate. There
are two lines of reasoning about the normative status of forming the
conditional intention to retaliate that conflict to form the paradox. One line
of reasoning holds that the consequences of forming the conditional
intention to retaliate (e.g., prevention of nuclear war and nuclear
blackmail) make formation of the intention morally right. A second line of
reasoning, however, holds that retaliation itself is morally wrong, and thus,
the conditional intention to retaliate must also be morally wrong. I have
labeled deterrence, in which these two lines of reasoning conflict, as
"paradoxical deterrence."
Each of these lines of reasoning requires certain assumptions about
nuclear deterrence. The first line of reasoning (consequentialist) holds that
forming the conditional intention is morally right because it is the best way
to prevent nuclear attack (it has the best consequences). Thus, for the
consequentialist line of reasoning to be successful, and for the paradox to
arise, we must assume that forming the conditional intention to retaliate is
the best way to prevent nuclear attack. One could make the claim that
forming the conditional intention to retaliate is not the best way to prevent
nuclear attack. Yet if some other policy could more effectively prevent a
nuclear first strike, then that policy would be morally right, rather than a
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policy of nuclear deterrence. In such a case, the paradox would not arise
because the consequentialist line of reasoning would no longer hold that
forming the conditional intention to retaliate was morally right.
The second line of reasoning (non-consequentialist) holds that nuclear
retaliation is morally wrong, and therefore, forming the intention to
retaliate (even the conditional intention) is also morally wrong. Thus, for
the non-consequentialist line of reasoning to be successful, and for the
paradox to arise, we must assume that nuclear retaliation is morally wrong.
One might claim that nuclear retaliation is morally right, if it would destroy
the opponents remaining missiles, or ensure the survival of the agent’s
nation. If this was the case, however, the non-consequentialist line of
reasoning would no longer hold that forming the intention was morally
wrong (since the act intended would be morally right) and the paradox
would not arise.
I am interested in those cases where the paradox does arise. Therefore,
rather than becoming entangled in the debate about whether forming the
conditional intention to retaliate is the best way to prevent nuclear attack, or
whether nuclear retaliation is always morally wrong, I have assumed that
forming the conditional intention is the best way to prevent attack and that
nuclear retaliation is morally wrong. By making these assumptions, I've
been able to concentrate more directly on the paradox itself.
Quine has observed that,
"The argument that sustains a paradox may expose the absurdity of a
buried premise or of some preconception previously reckoned as central to
physical theory, to mathematics or to the thinking process.... More than once
in history the discovery of paradox has been the occasion for major
reconstruction at the foundations of thought ."4 ^
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With these comments in mind, my method in studying this paradox has
been to examine the two lines of reasoning that sustain it. I suspected that
the appearance of the paradox indicated that there was a premise or
preconception in one, or both, of the lines of reasoning that should be
rejected. If such a premise could be identified and addressed, then the
paradox could be solved.
Allowing the assumptions that I've suggested above, I think that the
central question that breeds the paradox is whether there can be
circumstances in which it is morally right to intend to do an act that is
morally wrong. The consequentialist line of reasoning holds that there can
be such circumstances, while the non-consequentialist line of reasoning
holds there cannot. Hence the paradox.
In Chapter 2, I concentrated on the consequentialist line of reasoning,
which I found to be very plausible. This is not to claim that the
consequentialist perspective is true, but rather that within commonly
discussed consequentialist moral systems, it is consistent for the conditional
intention to retaliate to be morally right and retaliation itself to be morally
wrong. This line of reasoning treats the formation of the conditional
intention to retaliate, and the act of retaliation, as separate acts, each with a
unique set of consequences. Therefore, the normative evaluation of the
conditional intention to retaliate is based on the consequences of the act of
forming the intention, and is independent of the normative evaluation of
retaliation.
If we assume that forming the conditional intention to retaliate is the
best way to prevent a nuclear first strike, then it is consistent within the
42Quine, W.V. "The Ways of Paradox," in The Wavs of Paradox and Other Essays , Random
House, New York, 1966, p. 3
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consequentialist line of reasoning for the conditional intention to be
morally right, even if the act intended, retaliation, is morally wrong.
Whether or not forming the conditional intention to retaliate is, in fact, the
best way to prevent nuclear war is a different question. My claim is that the
first line of reasoning that leads to paradox is plausible and consistent.
In Chapter 3, I concentrated on the non-consequentialist line of
reasoning. I think there are serious difficulties with this line of reasoning
that are the cause of the paradox. This line of reasoning argues two points.
First, that nuclear retaliation is morally wrong. As I've suggested,
paradoxical deterrence requires this claim. Second, it is claimed that if
retaliation is morally wrong then the conditional intention to retaliate must
also be morally wrong. I've labeled the principle that supports this claim as
the Wrongful Intentions Principle (WIP).
I've suggested two problems with this line of reasoning. First is that this
line of reasoning does not address those cases where all the alternatives
available to an agent violate some non-consequentialist principle.
Arguments such as Al, that utilize the WIP, ignore this possibility and
require rejection of the conditional intention to retaliate without
consideration of the normative status of any of the alternatives.
A more important objection is directed at the WIP itself, which holds that
the normative evaluation of the intention to do an act depends solely on the
normative evaluation of the act itself. The WIP is required for the non-
consequentialist line of reasoning to work, but I think there are good
reasons to reject application of the WIP to the conditional intention to
retaliate. It seems to me that paradoxical deterrence is a case which is not
consistent with what we commonly take to be the relationship between an
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action and the intention to do that action. Therefore, the assumption that the
WIP can be applied to the case of nuclear deterrence seems to be the root of
the paradox. Or in Quine's terminology, it is the preconception that must be
challenged in order to explain the paradox.
In Chapter 3, I've shown how, in nuclear deterrence, the characteristics
of the relationship between the conditional intention to retaliate and the act
of retaliation are much different from what we normally believe the
relationship to be between an action and the intention to do the action. In
most cases, we believe that when an agent forms the intention to do an
action, the agent desires the action to come about. The intention may also be
seen as initiating a sequence of actions with the goal being the doing of the
action intended. In such a case, the agent's purpose in forming the intention
is to bring about the action. Finally, it is often the case that the only
noticeable effect or consequence of forming the intention to do an act is the
occurrence of the act itself.
For intentions with these characteristics, our intuitions seem to support
the WIP, and thus, it seems plausible to hold that the intention is also morally
wrong. We also may feel that the agent who forms an intention to do an act,
with full knowledge that the only consequence of forming the intention is to
bring about a morally wrong act, is demonstrating his desire to do the wrong
action, and thus, has some moral defect in his character that drives his desire
to bring about morally wrong actions. In such a circumstance, it seems
plausible to claim that the formation of the intention is a morally wrong act.
These features that make the WIP intuitively appealing are not present
in the case of the conditional intention to retaliate that is part of nuclear
deterrence. The agent who forms the conditional intention to retaliate does
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not desire to bring about the act of retaliation; he desires to prevent a
nuclear attack against his nation. He believes that forming the conditional
intention to retaliate is the best means of preventing such an attack. Thus,
he believes that he is fulfilling a moral imperative to protect the citizens of
his nation from nuclear attack by adopting the policy of nuclear deterrence;
his purpose is to prevent nuclear attack. In such a case, the formation of the
conditional intention may actually save innocent lives, even though the
intended act would take many lives.
The fact that the intention to retaliate is a conditional intention plays an
important part here. The agent's belief that the conditional intention to
retaliate will prevent a nuclear attack means that he believes that the
antecedent condition of the conditional intention will never obtain. Thus, he
forms the intention to do an act that he knows would be wrong, with the
belief that he will never have to do the wrong act; the formation of the
conditional intention will ensure that the antecedent condition will not
occur, or will have a very low probability of occurrence.
It also seems that these independent effects of forming the intention,
and the fact that the intention is not formed for the purpose of bringing
about the act, require that the intention and the action be treated as two
separate actions. Also, the fact that, in the case of conditional intentions, the
formation of the intention is usually separated temporally from the action
intended, and the fact that if the antecedent condition does not occur, then
the act will never be performed, also support the claim that the formation of
the intention and the action intended are separate acts. If these are two
separate actions, then it seems plausible to claim that a normative evaluation
can be made of the act of forming the intention independently of the
normative evaluation of retaliation.
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The difficulty in the non-consequentialist line of reasoning is that the
WIP does not provide an independent normative evaluation of the intention.
Rather, it simply assigns the normative evaluation of the act intended, to the
intention to do the act. Nuclear deterrence, however, is a case where the act
of forming an intention may have the best consequences of all the available
alternative actions (including not forming the intention), or may fulfill a
non-consequentialist moral imperative. Yet, the WIP ignores these factors in
the normative evaluation of the act of forming the intention to retaliate.
Therefore, I want to reject the WIP as a premise in the non-consequentialist
argument. Without the WIP, this line of reasoning breaks down and the
paradox is resolved.
One response to this might be to attempt a reformulation of the WIP, that
would take into account the unique features of the conditional intention to
retaliate in the normative evaluation of forming the intention. If the WIP
could be reformulated in this way, then the paradox might be revived. I don't
see how this could be done.
I think that the WIP is the preconception about intentions and actions
that creates the paradox. The WIP asserts that there is some type of special
relationship between an action and the intention to do the action such that if
the action is morally wrong then forming the intention must also be morally
wrong. Paradoxical deterrence is a case where this supposed special
relationship does not seem intuitively obvious, and in fact, seems counter-
intuitive. We may have never given much thought to the truth of the WIP,
until presented with a case like paradoxical deterrence, where it seems
wrong to apply the WIP. Until the objector could specify exactly what the
relationship is, and how it can account for the unique characteristics found
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in the case of the conditional intention to retaliate, then the WIP needs to be
rejected.
It might also be objected that regardless of the applicability of the WIP, a
morally good agent could not sincerely form the intention to do a wrong
action. I think that the independent effects of the conditional intention to
retaliate are what make it possible for the morally good agent to sincerely
intend retaliation, even when he knows that retaliation would be morally
wrong. The agent believes that he will never have to act on the intention,
because he believes that the formation of the intention will prevent nuclear
attack (the antecedent condition of the conditional intention will not obtain).
Likewise, the agent's purpose in adopting the intention does not include the
act of retaliation. If his opponent attacks in spite of his deterrent policy,
then retaliation does not contribute to his project— his project of preventing
attack, based on forming the conditional intention, has already failed.
Retaliation could not contribute to the project of preventing nuclear attack
once the attack has taken place.
It's also true that formation of the conditional intention is not an
irreversible policy adopted by the agent. We can expect the morally good
agent to be continually updating his assessment of the normative status of
the actions available to him as the situation changes. Should an attack occur,
it seems plausible to me to hold that the agent still has the option of not
retaliating, even though he had previously formed the sincere intention to
retaliate. I imagine that this is the case in the real life nuclear deterrence
practiced by the US. The President, and certainly the missile launch officers
in the ICBM silos, may have formed the sincere, conditional intention to
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retaliate if the US was attacked with nuclear weapons. They really intend to
retaliate.
But if an attack occurs, it’s not necessary that they retaliate. Perhaps the
nuclear destruction is even greater than they had imagined. Once they see
the destruction, perhaps they will reassess their plan and decide that
retaliation will serve no purpose. Or perhaps they will launch the retaliatory
strike as intended. The point is that even though they have formed a sincere
intention to retaliate, they are not locked into that policy as they would have
been after, for example, activating an automatic retaliation machine that
could not be turned off.
Thus, I think it can be plausible to imagine a morally good person who
can form the sincere intention to do a morally wrong act. But I think the
plausibility of this claim depends importantly on the independent effects of
the conditional intention to retaliate. If these factors were not present, then
it seems unlikely that the agent could sincerely form the intention.
Rejecting the WIP does not require rejecting the entire non-
consequentialist line of reasoning. Non-consequentialist principles still
might be applied to the conditional intention to retaliate. For example, if one
of the principles is that the deliberate killing of innocent civilians is
forbidden, then we need to ask whether the formation of the conditional
intention to retaliate would result in the deliberate killing of innocent
civilians. I don't think that in the forty years of nuclear deterrence, the
conditional intention to retaliate has resulted in the deliberate killing of any
innocents, thus forming the conditional intention does not seem to violate
this principle.
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If there were some principle which held that it is forbidden for
government leaders to subject the citizens of their nation to excessive risk of
nuclear attack, then the debate would be on how well nuclear deterrence can
prevent attack. This would call into question our assumption that nuclear
deterrence was the best means of preventing nuclear attack. But I think that
this is where the debate should be-- on how well the intention can prevent
attack, or whether there is another policy that could more effectively
prevent nuclear attack.
It seems misguided to me to reject forming the conditional intention to
retaliate solely on the basis of the normative status of the act of retaliation,
an act which may never occur, rather than assessing the conditional
intention to retaliate on its own merits. Therefore, I think that nuclear
deterrence is not "paradoxical deterrence" because we can resolve the
paradox in paradoxical deterrence by rejecting the WIP and revising our
preconceptions about the nature of the relationship between an action and
the conditional intention to do the action.
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